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The North American Black Duck 
(Anas rubripes): A Case Study of 28 
Years of Failure in American 
Wildlife Management 
John W. Grandy 
Abstract 
A scientific and technical analysis is presented of the factors which may have 
been primarily responsible for an estimated 60% decline in the black duck (Anas 
rubripes) population since 1955. The analyses presented show that the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service (FWS], the management agency responsible for waterfowl manage-
ment in the United States, has recognized the population decline, that the FWS's own 
experts have consistently recognized that hunting is the most likely cause of the 
population decline, and that hunting is the only mortality factor which wildlife 
managers can control in the practical sense. Using FWS information, the author 
shows, however, that from 1967 to 1982, regulations permitting killing of black ducks 
have in net effect only been made more permissive, while, since the early 1970's, the 
numbers of hunters and hunter days (hunter effort] have remained relatively high and 
hunting has accounted for 50% to 60% of total mortality. The author terms the con-
sistent failure of the FWS to take effective regulatory action to stop the decline and 
to attempt to restore the black duck population a failure of modern-day wildlife 
management. Using a series of quotations from knowledgeable individuals, the 
author presents an analysis of why this failure has occurred. 
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Introduction 
The black duck (Anas rubripes) 
population has been declining for many 
years, since at least 1955 (Fig. 1 ). This 
change has been chronicled by, most 
particularly, the winter inventory (de-
picted in Fig. 1), but also by the observa-
tions of hunters, bird watchers, U.S. and 
Canadian biologists, officials from pri-
vate conservation organizations, and 
others. Verification of the decline has 
taken a variety of forms: deductive rea-
soning based on underutilized breeding 
and wintering habitats, marked declines 
in hunter success based on kill per thou-
sand hunter days and kill per successful 
hunter, measured declines in breeding 
populations, high reproductive rates 
(characteristic of a population at a level 
substantially below carrying capacity), 
and declines in indirect population es-
timates based on analyses of banding 
data (see: Barske, 1968; Munro, 1968; 
Benson, 1968; Reed, 1968; Addy, 1968; 
Ceis et a/., 1971; Blandin, 1975, 1982; 
Anon., 1976, 1980, 1983; Crissey, 1976; 
Williams, 1976; Hunt, 1978; Newell and 
Boyd, 1978; Spencer, 1979, 1982, 1982a; 
Longcore, 1981; Maine, 1982; Hagar, 
1982; Heusmann, 1982; Smith, 1983; 
Connor, 1983). Using the winter inven-
tory as a measure, the average rate of 
dec! ine has been about 2% per year 
(since 1955) and the population has de-
clined about 60%. The decline has been 
FIGURE 1 Black duck Winter Inventory, 1955-19831 (Courtesy U.S. FWS (Anon., 1983)). 
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'Estimates are that the Winter Survey (Winter Inventory) records 1/3 to 1/5 of all black ducks (Martinson et 
a/., 1968:48; Martinet a/., 1967; Anon. 1976:8). The validity of using the winter inventory as an indicator of 
population trend is discussed by Smith (1983:3), Crissey (1976:2), and Heusmann (1980). 
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'Estimates are that the Winter Survey (Winter Inventory) records 1/3 to 1/5 of all black ducks (Martinson et 
a/., 1968:48; Martinet a/., 1967; Anon. 1976:8). The validity of using the winter inventory as an indicator of 
population trend is discussed by Smith (1983:3), Crissey (1976:2), and Heusmann (1980). 
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FIGURE 2 Range of the Black Duck (Courtesy U.S. FWS (Anon., 1983)). 
essentially rangewide 1 (Fig. 2), being 
most pronounced in the U.S. and western 
portions of the Canadian breeding range 
(see, for example, Stotts and Davis' 
(1960) study of what was then a major 
breeding population in the Chesapeake 
Bay area). 
However, despite the decline, 
acknowledged repeatedly by the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), the 
Canadian Wildlife Service (CWS), and by 
the relevant State conservation (or fish 
'The one possible exception to the rangewide de-
cline is the Canadian Maritime Provinces. Newell 
and Boyd (1978) presented data suggesting that the 
population had not declined there. However, the 
Newell and Boyd analysis only covered data through 
1976. Recent data (Spencer, 1982) showing a 76% 
decrease in Maine's black duck breeding popula-
tions strongly suggest that breeding populations 




lfiB Breeding and wintering 
§wintering 
and wildlife) agencies, regulations gov-
erning black duck hunting have, in sum, 
only been liberalized since 1968 (Table 
1 ). Indeed, since 1970, hunting seasons 
have, each year, been more permissive 
than in 1968, and the status of the black 
duck population has continued to deter-
iorate (Fig. 1 ). Furthermore, the negative 
effect of liberalized seasons has been 
compounded because the numbers of 
hunters and hunter days increased sharply 
between 1968 and the early 1970's, and 
have remained relatively high since then 
(Administrative Reports, files, Office of 
Migratory Bird Management, Patuxent 
Wildlife Research Center; Martin and 
Carney, 1977). And, 1968 was, signifi-
cantly, the year that Black Duck Sympo-
sium participants (Barske, 1968; Addy 
and Martinson, 1968:183-188; Addy, 1968a) 
concluded that the black duck popula-
SUPPLEMENT TO /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 4(4) 1983 
}. W. Grandy- Failure in American Wildlife Management Monograph 
tion was at its lowest point in about 20 
years and that major restrictions on 
black duck kill were necessary to allow 
the population to rebuild. 
In 1982, continued failure of the 
FWS to take action (Table 1) to protect 
the black duck and the continuing deter-
ioration of the black duck's status 
(Maine, 1982; Blandin, 1982; Spencer, 
i 982; Heusmann, 1982; Fig. 1) caused 
The Humane Society of the United 
States (HSUS), the Maine Audubon Soci-
ety, and one HSUS member from Maine 
to sue the FWS for a closed season. The 
suit was unsuccessfu I (Green, 1982). 
However, all agree that the decline of 
the black duck is real. Indeed, the Judge 
began the legal decision by noting that 
there had been a sharp decline in the 
black duck population (Green, 1982:3). 
The question remains for wildlife 
biologists, wildlife administrators, and 
the interested lay public: what happened 
to the system of wildlife management in 
the United States (and to some extent, 
Canada) that caused it to so consistently 
fai I to take necessary protective action 
on behalf of the black duck? 
To that end, this paper examines, in 
some detail, the potential reasons for 
the black duck population decline, the 
failure of the FWS and the States to take 
necessary corrective action, and the rea-
sons for that failure, in the hope that 
recognition of the factors involved will 
help prevent future failures and simulta-
neously help insure the welfare of wild-
life. 
Materials and Methods 
Literature on black ducks has been 
systematically reviewed. Primary sources 
of this literature were the files of the 
TABLE 1 Atlantic Flyway Hunting Regulations-1953-1982* 
Bag 
Season Black 
Year Length Total Duck 
1953 60 4 4 
1954 60 4 4 
1955 70 4 4 
1956 70 4 4 
1957 70 4 4 
1958 60 4 4 
1959 40 4 4 
1960 40 4 4 
1961 40 3 2 
1962 40 3 2 
1963 40 4 2 
1964 40 4 4 
1965 40 4 4 
1966 45 4 4 
1967 40 4 2 
1968 40 4 2 
1969 40 4 2 
1970 40 5 2 
1971 40 5 2 
1972 50 5 1 
1973 45 4 2 
1974 45·· 4 2 
1975 45·· 4 2 
1976 45·· 4 2 
1977 45·· 4 2 
1978 50 4 2 
1979 50 4 2 
1980 50 4 2 
1981 50 4 2 
1982 50 4 2 
Bag 
or Season Black or 
Length Total Duck 
50 3 3 
50 3 3 
50 2 2 
50 2 2 
50 3 2 
50 3 3 
50 3 3 
55 3 3 
50 3 2 
50 3 2 
50 3 2 
50 4 2 
50 4 2 
50 4 2 
45 5 1 
45•• 5 1 
45·· 5 1 
45·· 5 1 
45·· 5 1 
50 5 1 
50 5 1 
50 5 1 
50 5 1 
50 5 1 
Bag 
Season Black or 
Length Total Duck 
47 4 1 
60 3 1 
60 3 1 
60 3 1 
50 pts. "70" 
50t pts. "70" 
45•• pts. "70" 
45•· pts. "70" 
45•· pts. "70" 
50 pts. "70" 
50 pts. "70" 
50 pts. "70" 
50 pts. "70" 
50 pts. "70" 
Bag 
Season Black 
Length Total Duck 
57 3 
*Possession limit is double the daily bag in all instances. Split season allowed with 10% penalty through 
1969 and no penalty thereafter. Table 1 was provided by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 1982. 
**50 Days, with Wednesday noon opening. 
tSS Days, with Wednesday noon opening. 
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FIGURE 2 Range of the Black Duck (Courtesy U.S. FWS (Anon., 1983)). 
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U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's Office of 
Migratory Bird Management in Washing-
ton, D.C., 20240, and related files at the 
FWS's Patuxent Wildlife Research Center 
in Laurel, Maryland 20708. 
I should note here that this paper is 
a scientific and technical analysis of a 
situation which contains elements of 
science, politics, and other factors. For 
that reason, the literature cited is not 
always scientific literature; rather it is 
sometimes scientific, and sometimes con-
sists of memos, letters, and unpublished 
reports (authored by acknowledged experts 
or officials in positions of responsibility) 
which often represented the best and on-
ly information on which to base black 
duck management decisions. In present-
ing the "Literature Cited" section, I have 
attempted to present enough information 
to allow the interested reader to locate, ob-
tain, and evaluate the information which 
I have analyzed and which leads me to 
the conclusions I have reached. 
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Management, FWS, provided legally per-
mitted access to the files in Washington, 
D.C, and critically commented on the 
manuscript. Dr. Stephen Kellert, Yale 
University; Dr. Warren B. King, Chair-
man, U.S. Section of the International 
Council for Bird Preservation; and How-
ard Spencer, Wildlife Research Super-
visor, Maine Department of Inland Fish-
eries and Wildlife provided helpful com-
ments, as did Joseph A. Hagar, former 
Massachusetts State Ornithologist, and 
John W. Lanier, Chief Biologist, White 
Mountain National Forest in New Hamp-
shire. Despite this help, I alone am re-
6 
sponsible for the content and conclu-
sions of this paper. 
Results and Discussion 
Cause of Population Decline 
The cause of the population de-
cline must be, and must have been, total 
annual mortality that exceeds total an-
nual production (Anon., 1980:16) or the 
ability of the population to replenish 
itself. For the purposes of this discus-
sion, however, causes of the decline are 
divided into hunting mortality and other 
potential causes of the population de-
cline. Additional discussion is provided 
of the role of competition and/or hybrid-
ization with the mallard (Anas platyrhyn-
chos), because this has been mentioned 
often by the FWS as a cause of the black 
duck population decline. 
Hunting 
Results of major investigations into 
the cause or causes of the black duck 
population decline were not widely pub-
lished during the late 1950's and early 
1960's. Rather, it appears that much re-
search was underway during this period 
but was not reported until the Black 
Duck Symposium in 1968 (Barske, 1968)2 . 
Indeed, the Black Duck Symposium 
convened most of those then interested 
in or acknowledged as experts on black 
ducks. Sixty-nine participants registered: 
20 from the U.S. Bureau of Sport 
Fisheries and Wildlife (hereinafter refer-
red to as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice (FWS), the Federal agency responsi-
ble for migratory bird conservation and 
management in the U.S.); 27 from State 
conservation (or fish and wildlife) agen-
'The Black Duck Symposium, containing 16 papers 
and a record of discussions, was published in 1968 
by the Atlantic Waterfowl Council and Wildlife 
Management Institute (WMI), and was edited by WMI 
employee Philip Barske. Throughout this paper, the 
Symposium as a whole is cited as Barske (1968); in-
dividual papers and/or discussions are cited as 
"Author" (1968). 
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cies in the United States; 6 from the 
Canadian Wildlife Service ((CWS), Cana-
dian equivalent of the FWS); 5 from Pro-
vincial conservation agencies in Canada; 
6 from Canadian or U.S. universities; and 
5 from private organizations. The pur-
pose of the Symposium, in recognition 
of the declining status of the black duck, 
was to bring "together most of the known 
information on this species and to focus 
attention on its future needs." (Anon., 
1968:1). 
The 1968 Symposium on black ducks 
provided substantial evidence of a cau-
sal link between hunting and the popula-
tion decline, as the following excerpts 
show. 
C. E. Addy, then Atlantic Flyway 
Representative (biologist) for the FWS, 
stated: 
"[T]he evidence indicates that 
harvest has been excessive in rela-
tion to production. Kill has been 
the primary factor responsible for 
holding the population down to the 
level that it is." (Addy, 1968:4). 
William T. Munro, Wildlife Bio-
logist, Eastern Region, Canadian Wild-
life Service stated: 
"Most field workers in Canada be-
lieve that the major cause of this 
[black duck] decline is over-harvest." 
(Munro, 1968:7). 
Austin Reed, biologist with the 
Quebec Wildlife Service, stated: 
"The consensus of opinion [among 
Canadian biologists] is that the size 
of the hunting kill is the most likely 
explanation [for the population de-
c/ in e). ... A close correlation has 
been observed between Mid-Winter 
Survey counts of black ducks in the 
Atlantic Flyway and the breeding 
population on lie aux Pommes the 
following spring [Figure V). This 
suggests the like/ ihood that popu la-
tion level is being regulated be-
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tween late summer and mid-January 
[a period which corresponds close-
ly with the hunting season)." (Reed, 
1968:82). 
R. K. Martinson, A. D. Geis, and R. I. 
Smith, all FWS employees responsible 
for waterfowl investigations at Patuxent 
Wildlife Research Center, reported that 
hunting caused 50% to 60% of total 
mortality and concluded: 
"At that time [mid 1950's], hunting 
regulations were then relaxed and 
large kills were made. Despite a 
high population, the rate of kill was 
sufficient to boost total mortality 
higher than productivity, and the 
black duck population began to de-
cline. By 1959, the black duck pop-
ulation was obviously at a low level 
and hunting regulations were made 
very restrictive. The resu /ting an-
nual kills were small compared to 
earlier years but still large enough, 
with the much reduced size of the 
black duck population, to result in 
a kill rate of a magnitude that ap-
pears to have prevented an increase 
in the population." (Martinson et 
a/., 1968:43,50). 
C. E. Addy and R. K. Martinson in 
presenting the final paper at the Sym-
posium stated: 
"Speakers at this symposium 
generally share the opinion that the 
black duck population is low and 
that wise management dictates that 
we do something to increase the 
size of the population. Most speakers 
also felt that hunting regulations ef-
fect the size and rate of kill and, 
thus, the survival of black ducks." 
(Addy and Martinson, 1968:183). 
After the Symposium, Addy sum-
marized the proceedings for his super-
iors at FWS, stating: 
"It was the consensus of the group 
that while surveys were unreliable 
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and a record of discussions, was published in 1968 
by the Atlantic Waterfowl Council and Wildlife 
Management Institute (WMI), and was edited by WMI 
employee Philip Barske. Throughout this paper, the 
Symposium as a whole is cited as Barske (1968); in-
dividual papers and/or discussions are cited as 
"Author" (1968). 
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cies in the United States; 6 from the 
Canadian Wildlife Service ((CWS), Cana-
dian equivalent of the FWS); 5 from Pro-
vincial conservation agencies in Canada; 
6 from Canadian or U.S. universities; and 
5 from private organizations. The pur-
pose of the Symposium, in recognition 
of the declining status of the black duck, 
was to bring "together most of the known 
information on this species and to focus 
attention on its future needs." (Anon., 
1968:1). 
The 1968 Symposium on black ducks 
provided substantial evidence of a cau-
sal link between hunting and the popula-
tion decline, as the following excerpts 
show. 
C. E. Addy, then Atlantic Flyway 
Representative (biologist) for the FWS, 
stated: 
"[T]he evidence indicates that 
harvest has been excessive in rela-
tion to production. Kill has been 
the primary factor responsible for 
holding the population down to the 
level that it is." (Addy, 1968:4). 
William T. Munro, Wildlife Bio-
logist, Eastern Region, Canadian Wild-
life Service stated: 
"Most field workers in Canada be-
lieve that the major cause of this 
[black duck] decline is over-harvest." 
(Munro, 1968:7). 
Austin Reed, biologist with the 
Quebec Wildlife Service, stated: 
"The consensus of opinion [among 
Canadian biologists] is that the size 
of the hunting kill is the most likely 
explanation [for the population de-
c/ in e). ... A close correlation has 
been observed between Mid-Winter 
Survey counts of black ducks in the 
Atlantic Flyway and the breeding 
population on lie aux Pommes the 
following spring [Figure V). This 
suggests the like/ ihood that popu la-
tion level is being regulated be-
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tween late summer and mid-January 
[a period which corresponds close-
ly with the hunting season)." (Reed, 
1968:82). 
R. K. Martinson, A. D. Geis, and R. I. 
Smith, all FWS employees responsible 
for waterfowl investigations at Patuxent 
Wildlife Research Center, reported that 
hunting caused 50% to 60% of total 
mortality and concluded: 
"At that time [mid 1950's], hunting 
regulations were then relaxed and 
large kills were made. Despite a 
high population, the rate of kill was 
sufficient to boost total mortality 
higher than productivity, and the 
black duck population began to de-
cline. By 1959, the black duck pop-
ulation was obviously at a low level 
and hunting regulations were made 
very restrictive. The resu /ting an-
nual kills were small compared to 
earlier years but still large enough, 
with the much reduced size of the 
black duck population, to result in 
a kill rate of a magnitude that ap-
pears to have prevented an increase 
in the population." (Martinson et 
a/., 1968:43,50). 
C. E. Addy and R. K. Martinson in 
presenting the final paper at the Sym-
posium stated: 
"Speakers at this symposium 
generally share the opinion that the 
black duck population is low and 
that wise management dictates that 
we do something to increase the 
size of the population. Most speakers 
also felt that hunting regulations ef-
fect the size and rate of kill and, 
thus, the survival of black ducks." 
(Addy and Martinson, 1968:183). 
After the Symposium, Addy sum-
marized the proceedings for his super-
iors at FWS, stating: 
"It was the consensus of the group 
that while surveys were unreliable 
7 
/. W. Grandy- Failure in American Wildlife Management Monograph 
indicators of population status and 
that no surveys gave an accurate 
current population figure, the overall 
Flyway population had been de-
clining and was probably at its low-
est level of the past 20 years. Papers 
were presented on the various fac-
tors which tend to reduce- the popu-
lation or lower its productivity such 
as predation, loss of habitat, pollu-
tion, pesticides and others. How-
ever, with these factors in operation 
it was generally agreed that hunting 
kill was too great for the population 
to maintain itself at a high level. In 
fact, it was generally acknowledged 
that hunting kill is the only major 
mortality factor we can do anything 
about at the present time." (Addy, 
1968a). 
In 1971, a Special Scientific Report 
by three FWS biologists (Aelred D. Geis, 
Robert I. Smith (now in charge of black 
duck management, FWS) and John P. Rog-
ers, (now and since 1972 the Chief of the 
FWS Migratory Bird Management program) 
analyzed all banding data from 1922 to 
1960. The report noted that about 50% 
of total mortality was caused by hunting 
and concluded, in part: 
8 
"According to the winter survey, 
the continental black duck popula-
tion declined greatly between 1952 
and 1962. It is believed that the 
survey data correctly reflect the 
population trend during these years. 
Although the population was at a 
lower level, and the kill much 
smaller in 1959-1962 than in 1952-
1954, band recovery data show that 
kill rates were equally high in the 
two periods. The population decline 
was probably due to a high rate of 
kill associated with 70-day seasons 
and 4-bird bag limits during 1955-
1958. Failure of the black duck 
population to recover in recent 
years despite a lower kill is appar-
ently due to a continued high kill 
rate." (Geis eta/., 1971:49, 63). 
In 1974, Frank B. McGilvery, a FWS 
waterfowl biologist then stationed at 
Patuxent Wildlife Research Center, was 
asked to evaluate the black duck winter 
inventories over the preceding ten years. 
He reported to his superiors: 
"In reviewing the material compiled 
herein and in re-reading the material 
in the black duck symposium held 
at Chestertown in 1968, I am struck 
by what appears to be an inescapa-
ble fact- the major, amendable prob-
lem with the black duck is excessive 
harvest." (Emphasis in original). (Mc-
Gilvery, 1974:1). 
In 1976, Walter F. Crissey, formerly 
FWS Senior Scientist and for ten years 
Director of the FWS's Migratory Bird 
Population Station, wrote an authorita-
tive report on black ducks in which he 
concluded: 
"[J]t seems to me that all of the 
available information favors the hy-
pothesis that over-harvest has been 
the most likely cause of the de-
cline." (Crissey 1976:6). 
In 1976, Anderson and Burnham 
(1976), both FWS biostatisticians at 
Patuxent Wildlife Research Center, pub-
lished part of a study on mallards in 
which they concluded that past regres-
sion analyses which had been used in 
Martinson et a/. (1968) and Geis et a/. 
(1971) to "prove" an additive relation-
ship between hunting mortality and to-
tal mortality in black ducks, were in-
valid. Anderson and Burnham did not 
show that such a relationship does not 
exist. They simply used mathematical 
techniques to invalidate the regression 
analysis which biologists had previously 
used. Anderson and Burnham did not re-
fute- or even discuss- all of the other 
points made at the Black Duck Symposium 
(Barske, 1968) and elsewhere (i.e., Geis et 
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a/., 1971) suggesting a definite causal 
relationship between hunting mortality 
and the black duck population decline. 
Anderson and Burnham also did not 
show or even suggest that the program 
designed by Addy and Martinson (1968) 
to restore the black duck population 
would not have been successful. 
I.R.P. is the abbreviation for an "Im-
portant Resource Problem." Identifica-
tion of such a problem provides a mecha-
nism within the FWS for devising a 
strategy to combat the problem and for 
procuring funds to solve the problem. In 
1980, the Service prepared an I.R.P. 
strategy paper to assess problems asso-
ciated with declining populations of 
black ducks and designated the contin-
uing decline of the black duck popula-
tion the twentieth most pressing re-
source problem in the United States 
(Anon., 1980). As a result of the I.R.P. de-
signation, in 1980 the FWS assembled a 
group of 19 waterfowl, coastal, and es-
tuarine experts to examine the problems 
facing black ducks. These experts con-
cluded: 
"[T]he declining numbers of black 
ducks are primarily the result of an-
nual mortality that exceeds produc-
tion. Most of that mortality is di-
rectly related to hunting." (Anon., 
1980:16). 
In 1982, H.W. Heusmann, water-
fowl biologist for Massachusetts stated 
when discussing the decline of the con" 
tinental black duck population: 
"[H]unting is responsible for further 
reducing the [black duck] popula-
tion." (Heusmann, 1982:17) 
In 1982, Dr. Warren W. Blandin, 
based on the extensive analyses in .his 
dissertation and his many years of ex-
perience as the Atlantic Flyway water-
fowl biologist, FWS, concluded that kill 
of black ducks, particularly immatures, 
had been excessive throughout the prin-
cipal breeding range of the species. He 
further concluded that such kill would 
ensure a declining population (Blandin 
1982:122). In reaching his conclusion, 
Blandin (1982:89; 1982a:2) presented 
data comparing hunting mortality for 
the black duck and the mallard. (See be-
low.) 
These figures show that hunting is a 
far more important mortality factor for 
the black duck than for the mallard. Fur-
thermore, the detrimental effect of hunt-
ing for black ducks is compounded by 
the fact that total mortality for im-
mature black ducks is 7% higher than 
for immature mallards (Blandin, 1982a:2). 
In 1982, Joseph A. Hagar, former 
Massachusetts State Ornithologist and a 
respected authority on black ducks, con-
cluded on the basis of available data 
and his knowledge, that hunting is a 
significant contributing cause of the 
black duck decline. Hagar also noted 
"that black ducks are under heavy gun-
ning pressure and that many hunters in 
the northeast try to shoot black ducks 
above all other species." (Hagar, 1982). 
In 1982, the Black Duck Manage-
ment Plan, developed by professional 
waterfowl biologists working for U.S. 
States and Canadian Provinces in the 
Atlantic Flyway, together with CWS and 
FWS officials, explicity acknowledged a 
link between hunting and population de-
cline and stated: 
"Present levels of sport hunting are 
depressing black duck populations 
by reducing the survival of imma-
ture birds." (Spencer, 1982a:15). 
The FWS agreed with this assess-
ment in a publication dated September 
17,1982 (Potter, 1982:41253). 
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the northeast try to shoot black ducks 
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In 1982, the Black Duck Manage-
ment Plan, developed by professional 
waterfowl biologists working for U.S. 
States and Canadian Provinces in the 
Atlantic Flyway, together with CWS and 
FWS officials, explicity acknowledged a 
link between hunting and population de-
cline and stated: 
"Present levels of sport hunting are 
depressing black duck populations 
by reducing the survival of imma-
ture birds." (Spencer, 1982a:15). 
The FWS agreed with this assess-
ment in a publication dated September 
17,1982 (Potter, 1982:41253). 
HUNTING MORTALITY AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL MORTALITY 













]. W. Grandy- Failure in American Wildlife Management Monograph 
The implication, or easily drawn in-
ference, that the population is declining 
only because of the death of immature 
black ducks seems questionable at best. 
The assertion is apparently based on 
Blandin's (1982a:2) comparative mortali-
ty figures which show substantially 
higher juvenile mortality rates from hun-
ting for black ducks than for juvenile 
mallards. This fact is certainly cause for 
concern; however, when a population 
declines by about 60%, as the black 
duck population has, "the loss of adults 
from the breeding population due to 
hunting must have a negative impact on 
the population" (Hagar 1982). In addi-
tion, as wildlife managers have long 
recognized, since adults are presumably 
experienced breeders, they are probably 
more successful in producing young than 
are ducks breeding for the first time. 
Therefore, the loss of adults to the popu-
lation is probably more debilitating to 
the population (per duck killed) than is 
the loss of immatures, and any sugges-
tion or hypothesis that the population is 
declining only because of hunting mor-
tality of immatures should be rejected. 
Other Potential Causes 
The FWS, officially, and others such 
as New jersey officials have consistently 
stated that "other" factors are "major" 
causes of the population decline. Among 
those consistently cited are deteriora-
tion or loss of habitat, and in the case of 
New jersey, severe winter mortality. 
While some losses certainly are attribu-
table to these causes, the data suggest 
that they are not in any sense "major", 
when compared with hunting. 
The quantity and quality of black 
duck wintering habitat has no doubt de-
creased since 1955; however, the availa-
ble evidence suggests that wintering 
habitat and winter mortality are not 
limiting factors for the black duck. In-
deed, the FWS I.R.P. paper essentially 
concluded (in 1980) that wintering habi-
tat was sufficient for black duck popula-
tions (Anon., 1980:13). 
10 
The 1971 FWS Special Scientific Re-
port concluded that "[T]here was no 
evidence of unusual mortality of black 
ducks during the late winter and early 
spring.", and that "[l]t appears that after 
the close of the hunting season black 
ducks survived at a relatively high rate" 
and that "[L]ate winter and early spring 
non-hunting mortality is not serious 
when viewed on a continent-wide scale." 
(Geis eta/., 1971 :66). 
My doctoral research (concluded in 
1972) suggests that more than adequate 
food exists for black ducks in major 
wintering areas, except under extremely 
severe winter conditions (Grandy, 1972: 
25). Indeed, since far fewer black ducks 
are using important coastal wintering 
grounds, as compared with 10 to 15 years 
ago, and their habitat has not been occu-
pied by other species, it seems logical to 
conclude that there must be adequate 
winter food and habitat. For example, no 
one has suggested that the 52% decline 
(Avg. 1972-76 com pared with Avg. 1977-
1981) in the wintering population in 
Maine (Spencer, 1982: App. A) has been 
associated with a comparable deteriora-
tion in quantity or quality of available 
habitat. Indeed, the contrary is more 
likely true of the entire Atlantic Flyway: 
still-suitable areas of habitat are unused 
or underutilized by black ducks in com-
parison to carrying capacity and to past 
use levels. 
Crissey (1976:6) concluded that "I 
know of nothing that supports" the con-
tention that deterioration of wintering 
habitat is a possible cause of the black 
duck decline. 
Local winter mortality may some-
times be substantial during severe win-
ters (Hagar, 1948, 1950; Grandy, 1972; 
Ferrigno (New jersey Fish and Game), 
1982, pers. comm.; Anon., 1980:13). The 
I.R.P. analysis noted that severe winter 
mortality may occur about one year in 
ten (Anon., 1980:13). My analysis of 
weather patterns in New England sug-
gested a somewhat greater potential fre-
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quency (Grandy, 1972:25), as did Hagar's 
(1948, 1950) experience. However, even 
if severe winter mortality occurs somewhat 
more frequently than once every ten 
years, it is a natural mortality factor with 
which black ducks have always contended 
and to which they have presumably 
adapted, and over which managers have 
no practical control because of the u n-
predictable and localized nature of such 
mortality. 
As an aside, however, even if severe 
winter mortality occurs somewhat more 
frequently than once every ten years, 
such a situation provides no rationale or 
justification for encouraging a high level 
of black duck hunting kill (as New jersey 
officials have suggested) on the expecta-
tion that severe winter weather may 
sometimes follow. Indeed, wildlife man-
agers typically have never managed on 
the basis of the lowest possible carrying 
capacity, as caused by unpredictable 
and nearly random catastrophic events 
such as severe winter weather. For exam-
ple, neither deer (Odocoileus v1rg1-
nianus) nor waterfowl have ever been 
managed to attain the lowest possible 
pre-winter population based on an ana-
lysis of the lowest possible carrying cap-
acity, as caused by occasional severe 
winters. Rather, managers typically at-
tempt to manage for a high over-winter 
population, so as to maximize reproduc-
tion. To do otherwise would completely 
remove the beneficial effects on wildlife. 
populations of genetic selection caused 
by events such as winter mortality in-
duced by food shortage, would reduce 
the "margin for error" in traditional 
wildlife management, and would neces-
sitate extremely low wildlife popula-
tions. 
The situation with respect to the 
quantity and quality of available breeding 
habitat is quite similar to that for winter-
ing habitat. The black duck breeding 
range in eastern Canada is more than 
1,000,000 square miles (Reed, 1978; 
Spencer, 1979). It includes the eastern 
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Canadian boreal forest, the Maritime 
Provinces, Quebec, and much of Onta-
rio. Substantial additional potential 
breeding range is found in the Eastern 
United States (Fig. 2). 
Breeding populations have declined 
substantially or disappeared in major 
parts of the historic breeding range, in-
cluding areas of the mid-Atlantic States, 
New England, New York, Quebec, and 
Ontario. These declines are not, except 
in a few instances, demonstrably associ-
ated with habitat changes. For example, 
Canadian officials have consistently 
concluded, beginning at the 1968 Black 
Duck Symposium, that breeding habitat 
is not a limiting factor in Canada (Munro 
1968:7; Reed 1968:82; Spencer, 1976). 
New York State biologist Dirck Benson 
reported a similar, and increasing, trend 
of vacant breeding habitat in the United 
States (Benson, 1968:14). Participants at-
tending the two-day Black Duck Workshop 
in Calais, Maine, in July 1976 (including 
FWS, CWS, State and Provincial offi-
cials) concluded that the available infor-
mation indicated that Canadian breed-
ing habitat for the black duck is not a 
limiting factor (Spencer, 1976:6, App.:10). 
Crissey, in his 1976 black duck re-
port, concluded: 
"In this respect, lack of either quan-
tity or quality of breeding habitat 
does not appear to be a limiting fac-
tor at present population levels. 
Rather, the high rate of reproduc-
tion associated with black ducks in 
recent years is characteristic of a 
population that is well below the 
carrying capacity of its breeding 
habitat." (Crissey, 1976:7). 
Blandin, in his 1982 doctoral disser-
tation, reaffirmed this conclusion: 
"The implication for black ducks is 
that although annual production 
may be high in response to a declin-
ing breeding population, the re-
cruitment of young birds into the 
11 
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1982, pers. comm.; Anon., 1980:13). The 
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mortality may occur about one year in 
ten (Anon., 1980:13). My analysis of 
weather patterns in New England sug-
gested a somewhat greater potential fre-
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quency (Grandy, 1972:25), as did Hagar's 
(1948, 1950) experience. However, even 
if severe winter mortality occurs somewhat 
more frequently than once every ten 
years, it is a natural mortality factor with 
which black ducks have always contended 
and to which they have presumably 
adapted, and over which managers have 
no practical control because of the u n-
predictable and localized nature of such 
mortality. 
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winter mortality occurs somewhat more 
frequently than once every ten years, 
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tion that severe winter weather may 
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the basis of the lowest possible carrying 
capacity, as caused by unpredictable 
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such as severe winter weather. For exam-
ple, neither deer (Odocoileus v1rg1-
nianus) nor waterfowl have ever been 
managed to attain the lowest possible 
pre-winter population based on an ana-
lysis of the lowest possible carrying cap-
acity, as caused by occasional severe 
winters. Rather, managers typically at-
tempt to manage for a high over-winter 
population, so as to maximize reproduc-
tion. To do otherwise would completely 
remove the beneficial effects on wildlife. 
populations of genetic selection caused 
by events such as winter mortality in-
duced by food shortage, would reduce 
the "margin for error" in traditional 
wildlife management, and would neces-
sitate extremely low wildlife popula-
tions. 
The situation with respect to the 
quantity and quality of available breeding 
habitat is quite similar to that for winter-
ing habitat. The black duck breeding 
range in eastern Canada is more than 
1,000,000 square miles (Reed, 1978; 
Spencer, 1979). It includes the eastern 
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Canadian boreal forest, the Maritime 
Provinces, Quebec, and much of Onta-
rio. Substantial additional potential 
breeding range is found in the Eastern 
United States (Fig. 2). 
Breeding populations have declined 
substantially or disappeared in major 
parts of the historic breeding range, in-
cluding areas of the mid-Atlantic States, 
New England, New York, Quebec, and 
Ontario. These declines are not, except 
in a few instances, demonstrably associ-
ated with habitat changes. For example, 
Canadian officials have consistently 
concluded, beginning at the 1968 Black 
Duck Symposium, that breeding habitat 
is not a limiting factor in Canada (Munro 
1968:7; Reed 1968:82; Spencer, 1976). 
New York State biologist Dirck Benson 
reported a similar, and increasing, trend 
of vacant breeding habitat in the United 
States (Benson, 1968:14). Participants at-
tending the two-day Black Duck Workshop 
in Calais, Maine, in July 1976 (including 
FWS, CWS, State and Provincial offi-
cials) concluded that the available infor-
mation indicated that Canadian breed-
ing habitat for the black duck is not a 
limiting factor (Spencer, 1976:6, App.:10). 
Crissey, in his 1976 black duck re-
port, concluded: 
"In this respect, lack of either quan-
tity or quality of breeding habitat 
does not appear to be a limiting fac-
tor at present population levels. 
Rather, the high rate of reproduc-
tion associated with black ducks in 
recent years is characteristic of a 
population that is well below the 
carrying capacity of its breeding 
habitat." (Crissey, 1976:7). 
Blandin, in his 1982 doctoral disser-
tation, reaffirmed this conclusion: 
"The implication for black ducks is 
that although annual production 
may be high in response to a declin-
ing breeding population, the re-
cruitment of young birds into the 
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breeding population is insufficient 
to attain the rate of growth inherent 
in the population and attainable rel-
ative to the carrying capacity of its 
habitat." (Blandin, 1982:119). 
Thus, Blandin and Crissey indepen-
dently concluded that breeding habitat 
is not a limiting factor. 
Additional support for the sugges-
tion that breeding habitat is not limiting 
is found in recent data from Maine and 
Massachusetts. Surveys of the same 
marsh areas in Maine "suggest a 76% 
decline in production [of young black 
ducks] from 1956-1981" (Spencer, 
1982:App. B). Furthermore, "none of the 
data revealed any changing trends in the 
average brood size" (Spencer, 1982:App. 
B). Maine biologists (Spencer, 1983, pers. 
comm.) also report that there has not 
been any major influx of mallards into 
traditional black duck nesting areas and 
that measured declines in breeding 
black ducks have not been correlated 
with a concomitant increase in mallards 
or any other species. Thus, the drastic 
decline in black duck production is 
caused by a lack of breeders, not by 
some factor which might be causing a 
decrease in the number of ducklings per 
brood. Further, high quality nesting 
areas are still available; there are not 
enough black ducks to occupy them. 
This conclusion is buttressed by the 
results of jerry R. Longcore, a FWS 
waterfowl research biologist studying 
black ducks in Maine. The preliminary 
results of Longcore's work show: 
"[T]hat habitat quantity and quality 
have improved substantially [in 
south-central Maine] but without a 
corresponding increase in black 
duck numbers." (Longcore, 1981 :7). 
The inescapable conclusion is that 
black duck production in Maine is down 
because there are fewer black ducks 
present to produce, not because of a 
loss of habitat. 
12 
In Massachusetts, in 1967, 276 black 
ducks and 216 mallards were banded by 
state employees. In 1981, only 51 black 
ducks and 293 mallards were banded us-
ing comparable techniques, relatively 
constant effort, and in essentially the 
same habitat (Hagar, 1982:4; Heusmann 
(Mass. State Waterfowl biologist), 1982, 
pers. comm.). These data indicate that 
habitat is still available, and the relative-
ly small increase in mallards (as com-
pared to the relatively large decrease in 
black ducks) cannot be the chief cause 
of the black duck decline. The salient 
points are that breeding black ducks are 
present in far smaller numbers than 
previously and that suitable breeding 
habitat is apparently still available. 
Taken together, these data indicate 
the availability of large amounts of 
unused or under-utilized breeding habitat 
in Canada, New York, Maine, Massachu-
setts, and probably other areas as well. 
While some local decreases in potential 
black duck production have undoubtedly 
occurred due to habitat degradation and 
destruction, essentially all of the actual 
decreased production may be attributed 
to the insufficient number of breeders to 
occupy available habitat. 
If environmental contaminants such 
as DDT are a serious cause of the black 
duck decline, one would expect produc-
tivity (in terms of number of young pro-
duced per breeding female) to be reduc-
ed. This apparently has not been the 
case. Howard Spencer, the Migratory 
Bird Research Leader in Maine and 
Chairman of the Atlantic Flyway Black 
Duck Committee, reported the results of 
a study of brood size and production 
from 1956 to 1981, and concluded that 
"none of the data revealed any changing 
trends in brood size .... " (Spencer, 1982). 
Crissey (1976) and Blandin (1982:121) 
likewise reported that the production 
rate in individual black ducks is high 
(1.49 immatures per adult as estimated 
from wing samples; Crissey, 1976:4) when 
compared with other species. Also, in the 
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l.R.P. analysis the assembled experts 
suggested that, while black duck pro-
ductivity may once have been decreased 
by DDT-induced eggshell thinning, this 
influence was gone after 1978 (Anon., 
1980:12). This evidence strongly suggests 
that black duck productivity is not being 
depressed (at least below levels found in 
other species) by environmental contam-
inants. 
Finally, it is important to put the 
problem of these other potentially lim-
iting factors in perspective. The 19 FWS 
professional biologists and experts who 
compiled the 1980 l.R.P. analysis con-
cluded that only 15% of the problem of 
annual mortality of black ducks winter-
ing on the Atlantic Coast was caused by 
the following seven factors taken to-
gether: disease, predation, accidents, oil 
spills, contaminants, weather and cli-
mate, and mallard hybridization and 
competition (Anon., 1980:4). Hybridiza-
tion and competition are discussed in 
the following section. Of the remainder, 
predation, most accidents, weather and 
climate, and most diseases are natural 
population forces which cannot be con-
trolled. Oil spills and contaminants may 
certainly be important and should be 
controlled to the extent possible; how-
ever, based on the I RP analysis and logic 
they cumulatively represent at most a 
small contributing factor in the decline 
of the black duck population. 
Relationships with Mallards 
The FWS in its recent official 
publications suggests that another "ma-
jor factor" in the black duck decline is 
"competition with mallards, and hybridi-
zation with mallards" (Arnett, 1982:36581). 
While some hybridization with mallards 
has always occurred on the edges of the 
breeding range, there is no reason to 
conclude that either hybridization or 
competition with the mallard could be 
the "major" cause of the continuing de-
cline of the black duck population, for 
the reasons which follow. 
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Among ducks, competition in the bier 
logical sense seldom involves physical 
competition. To be sure, two male ducks 
of different species (i.e., mallard and 
black duck) may fight over a given nest 
site or territory. However, this would be 
the exception; far more likely, either the 
black duck or the mallard finds a par-
ticular area already occupied. In such a 
case, the bird not occupying the area 
would almost certainly be displaced but 
no competition, in the physical sense, 
would have occurred. In either circum-
stance (displacement or physical com-
petition), the male and his mate would 
simply try to find a suitable alternative 
territory and nest site. 
Therein lies the essential fallacy in 
the view that competition for nesting 
sites or territory, as suggested in official 
publications of the FWS, is a cause of 
black duck decline. Much suitable high 
quality breeding habitat is underutilized 
throughout the range of the black duck 
and has been for many years (see pages 
11 to 12). Hence, while competition for 
or displacement from a suitable territory 
must occasionally occur, there are num-
erous unoccupied areas available in high 
quality habitat. Thus, this type of com-
petition cannot be a cause of the contin-
uing black duck population decline. 
The word "competition" can also 
be applied to the process of mate selec-
tion in ducks. Closely related species 
such as the black duck and mallard in-
terbreed occasionally and must, on oc-
casion, compete for mates. This permits 
hybridization which has always occur-
red on the margins of the black duck 
breeding range, where mallards and 
black ducks intermingle. 
Hybridization of black ducks and 
mallards, which has now reached 13% 
as measured in Atlantic Flyway wing 
samples (Anon., 1980:13), has certainly 
been exacerbated by the practice of 
various State conservation (or fish and 
wildlife) agencies, as well as private 
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breeding population is insufficient 
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in the population and attainable rel-
ative to the carrying capacity of its 
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some factor which might be causing a 
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brood. Further, high quality nesting 
areas are still available; there are not 
enough black ducks to occupy them. 
This conclusion is buttressed by the 
results of jerry R. Longcore, a FWS 
waterfowl research biologist studying 
black ducks in Maine. The preliminary 
results of Longcore's work show: 
"[T]hat habitat quantity and quality 
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corresponding increase in black 
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The inescapable conclusion is that 
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Hybridization of black ducks and 
mallards, which has now reached 13% 
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samples (Anon., 1980:13), has certainly 
been exacerbated by the practice of 
various State conservation (or fish and 
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organizations, of releasing tame or 
"game farm" mallards. Programs such as 
these have been conducted by the Penn-
sylvania Game Commission, the Mary-
land Fish and Wildlife Agency, and 
groups along the Mississippi Flyway. 
Hybridization along the margins of 
the black duck range must, however, be 
viewed in context. The increasing per-
centage of hybrids in the population is 
caused by the decline of the black duck 
population as much as by an absolute in-
crease in hybrids. When the availability 
of mates for prospective breeders has 
been reduced, black ducks may tend to 
breed with the more available and num-
erous mallard (where the two occur to-
gether). Also, the number of hybrids, 
when tallied, will be divided by a smaller 
black duck population to achieve the 
percentage. Under this circumstance the 
percentage of hybrids cannot help but 
show an increase. When pioneering into 
traditional black duck habitat, mallards 
are finding much of the suitable habitat 
available and unoccupied by black ducks 
(see pages 11 to 12). Thus, the mallard 
will be recorded as spreading and, in the 
terminology of some, the black duck 
will have been "displaced." But the 
cause of the increase in hybridization 
and displacement may not, under these 
circumstances, properly be attributed to 
the mallard; rather it must be attributed 
to the substantial mortality of the black 
duck, which has resulted in much under-
utilized breeding habitat. 
This conclusion is not new. Crissey 
concluded in his 1976 report that: 
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"Much has been said lately about 
the increase in mallards in the east 
and the possibility that mallards are 
pushing blacks out of portions of 
their breeding range. However, it 
seems evident that within the black 
duck population as a whole there-
productive rate is very high. This 
suggests to me that although mal-
lards are nesting now in portions of 
the black duck breeding range where 
they were not present before, that 
there is no evidence as yet that the 
presence of mallards is inhibiting 
the ability of blacks to reproduce. 
It is a moot question whether mal-
lards would withdraw from areas in-
to which they have extended their 
range if black ducks were allowed 
to increase to former levels. So, of 
course, is the question of whether 
the overall black duck breeding 
range is as capable of producing 
birds as it was before the mallards 
moved in. I suggest the only answer 
to questions like these is to manage 
so as to allow the black duck breeding 
population to increase and then see 
what happens." (Crissey, 1976:9). 
Blandin, in his 1982 doctoral disser-
tation, came to much the same conclu-
sion: 
"Recruitment to the breeding 
population probably has been de-
pressed by the removal of too many 
young birds. Not only does this en-
sure a declining population, but in 
areas where the black duck must 
compete with the mallard, a numer-
ically depressed breeding popula-
tion is a decided disadvantage." 
(Blandin, 1982:122-123). 
It is also important to put the cur-
rent status of this problem into per-
spective. The FWS, in its official an-
nouncements, has described the prob-
lem of competition and hybridization 
with mallards as "major." However, the 
FWS's I.R.P. strategy paper compiled by 
19 experts concluded that only 15% of 
the current problem could be attributed 
to seven factors, only one of which was 
hybridization and competition with mal-
lards (Anon., 1980:9). Thus, hybridization 
and competition with the mallard must 
currently represent a substantially 
smaller portion of the problem of declin-
ing black ducks than 15%. 
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Finally, it is important to note that, 
if I and the others are wrong about the 
current impact of mallard competition 
and hybridization (i.e., they are serious 
causes of the decline), the appropriate 
management strategy is to eliminate 
hunter kill and allow the black duck 
breeding population to increase to the 
extent possible (presumably to carrying 
capacity) (see: Crissey 1976:9; Smith 
1983:4). This would dilute the effect of 
hybridization and at least give black 
ducks the greatest competitive chance. 
Hunting: The One Factor Managers 
Control 
Clearly, the possibility exists that 
my analysis and the quoted or cited ana-
lyses of others may be in error. After all, 
one may never know with absolute cer-
tainty which, among many, mortality 
factors would have killed the ducks that 
otherwise would have nested. 
However, it is only reasonable to 
assume that hunting is the likely cause 
of a population decline (and is preven-
ting population recovery) when, as in the 
case of the black duck, hunting is the 
known cause of 50 to 60 percent of total 
annual mortality (Martinson eta/., 1968; 
Geis eta/., 1971; Blandin, 1982, 1982a) 
and other mortality causes have been ex-
amined and found to be within "rea-
sonable," "normal" I im its. 
Moreover, it is nearly axiomatic in 
wildlife management that hunting is the 
only mortality factor that managers can 
control, in a practical sense. For exam-
ple, Gabrielson (1941) emphasized the 
importance of limiting hunter kill as the 
primary tool for insuring the preserva-
tion of adequate "breeding stock." This 
point was again made by Trippensee (1953) 
in Volume II of his textbook on wildlife 
management. Specifically in reference 
to the black duck, the point has been 
made, implicitly and explicitly, time and 
again that hunting kill is the only mor-
tality factor that can be controlled in 
the short run (see particularly Addy, 
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1968, 1968a; Anon., 1980:16-17; Heus-
mann, 1982; Spencer, 1982; Connor (quot-
ing FWS Director Robert A. Jantzen), 
1983:2). 
And, this guiding principle of wild-
life and black duck management is 
deeply imbedded in the principles which 
presumably guide black duck and all 
waterfowl management by the FWS. For 
example, then FWS Director Greenwalt 
(1976) stated in approving "stabilized 
regulations" that they were "designed to 
protect the resource base." In the en-
vironmental assessment of the stabilized 
regulations program for black ducks, 
FWS stated that the "[l]ntegrity of the re-
source base will be maintained." (Anon., 
1976:i). Finally, the FWS, in its "Objec-
tives of the Migratory Bird Hunting 
Regulations" published each year (with 
the regulations) states as an objective: 
"To limit harvest of migratory game 
birds to levels compatible with their 
ability to maintain their popula-
tions." (Arnett, 1982a:16720). 
Yet, as Table 1 and the analyses 
presented in this paper show, making 
adequate and effective reduction in the 
kill is the one action which nearly all of 
the managers or administrators responsi-
ble for the black duck have consistently 
failed to take to reverse the population 
decline, or even maintain the population. 
In 1976, Anderson and Burnham 
(1976) showed that, in some mallard 
populations which are subject to hunt-
ing, the phenomenon of compensatory 
mortality occurs, that is: at some level 
of resources and population pressure, 
and below a certain (threshold) level of 
exploitation (kill), as the rate of hunting 
mortality increases, the rate of non-
hunting mortality decreases, thereby 
"compensating." Anderson and Burn-
ham also noted that it may be easy for 
kill rates to exceed these threshold 
levels, particularly in areas where, or at 
times when, ducks are especially vulner-
able. 
15 
f. W. Grandy- Failure in American Wildlife Management Monograph 
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lards (Anon., 1980:9). Thus, hybridization 
and competition with the mallard must 
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ing black ducks than 15%. 
SUPPLEMENT TO /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 4(4) 1983 
f. W. Grandy- Failure in American Wildlife Management Monograph 
Finally, it is important to note that, 
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hunter kill and allow the black duck 
breeding population to increase to the 
extent possible (presumably to carrying 
capacity) (see: Crissey 1976:9; Smith 
1983:4). This would dilute the effect of 
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Hunting: The One Factor Managers 
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of a population decline (and is preven-
ting population recovery) when, as in the 
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annual mortality (Martinson eta/., 1968; 
Geis eta/., 1971; Blandin, 1982, 1982a) 
and other mortality causes have been ex-
amined and found to be within "rea-
sonable," "normal" I im its. 
Moreover, it is nearly axiomatic in 
wildlife management that hunting is the 
only mortality factor that managers can 
control, in a practical sense. For exam-
ple, Gabrielson (1941) emphasized the 
importance of limiting hunter kill as the 
primary tool for insuring the preserva-
tion of adequate "breeding stock." This 
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in Volume II of his textbook on wildlife 
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1968, 1968a; Anon., 1980:16-17; Heus-
mann, 1982; Spencer, 1982; Connor (quot-
ing FWS Director Robert A. Jantzen), 
1983:2). 
And, this guiding principle of wild-
life and black duck management is 
deeply imbedded in the principles which 
presumably guide black duck and all 
waterfowl management by the FWS. For 
example, then FWS Director Greenwalt 
(1976) stated in approving "stabilized 
regulations" that they were "designed to 
protect the resource base." In the en-
vironmental assessment of the stabilized 
regulations program for black ducks, 
FWS stated that the "[l]ntegrity of the re-
source base will be maintained." (Anon., 
1976:i). Finally, the FWS, in its "Objec-
tives of the Migratory Bird Hunting 
Regulations" published each year (with 
the regulations) states as an objective: 
"To limit harvest of migratory game 
birds to levels compatible with their 
ability to maintain their popula-
tions." (Arnett, 1982a:16720). 
Yet, as Table 1 and the analyses 
presented in this paper show, making 
adequate and effective reduction in the 
kill is the one action which nearly all of 
the managers or administrators responsi-
ble for the black duck have consistently 
failed to take to reverse the population 
decline, or even maintain the population. 
In 1976, Anderson and Burnham 
(1976) showed that, in some mallard 
populations which are subject to hunt-
ing, the phenomenon of compensatory 
mortality occurs, that is: at some level 
of resources and population pressure, 
and below a certain (threshold) level of 
exploitation (kill), as the rate of hunting 
mortality increases, the rate of non-
hunting mortality decreases, thereby 
"compensating." Anderson and Burn-
ham also noted that it may be easy for 
kill rates to exceed these threshold 
levels, particularly in areas where, or at 
times when, ducks are especially vulner-
able. 
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Interestingly, from 1976 onward, 
the FWS used the findings by Anderson 
and Burnham (1976) of some compensa-
tory mortality in mallards as a rationale 
or partial justification for failing to take 
action to restrict or close the season on 
black ducks. Paraphrased, the FWS posi-
tion has been: "that Anderson and Burn-
ham found some compensatory mortality 
in mallards, and no one has been able to 
prove conclusively that total mortality is 
increased in black ducks because of hunt-
ing. In short, there is no guarantee that 
the population will increase if hunting is 
stopped." (see: FWS comments in refus-
ing to close the 1976 black duck season 
(Anon., 1976:19)). 
Such use of Anderson and Burnham's 
work is, in my opinion, a misuse of valid 
scientific research. The results of Ander-
son and Burnham, showing a compensa-
tory relationship between some hunting 
and non-hunting mortality in mallards at 
certain times and in certain areas does 
not absolve wildlife managers, and oth-
ers responsible for migratory birds, of 
using their one major management tool 
(limiting or eliminating kill) in an effort 
to restore a declining population. After 
all, Anderson and Burnham's work could 
not in any manner be used as strong sup-
port for a hypothesis that the black duck 
population decline (averaging about 2% 
per year) could not be reversed if the 
FWS and CWS were to eliminate the 50 
to 60 percent (Blandin, 1982a:2) of total 
mortality currently caused by hunting. 
And even if someone were to seriously 
make such a hypothesis, the only way to 
test it with certainty would be to close 
the black duck hunting season and moni-
tor the population response. 
Moreover, there is substantial rea-
son to conclude that the findings of 
Anderson and Burnham regarding the 
compensatory nature of hunting and 
non-hunting mortality would not be ap-
plicable to a seriously declining popula-
tion I ike the black duck. The phenome-
non of compensatory mortality includes 
16 
"concepts of carrying capacity, resource 
limitation, and population regulation 
through density dependent feedback 
processes" (Anderson and Burnham, 
1976:7). In short, the phenomenon of 
compensation is based on resource limita-
tion (i.e., if an animal dies of something, 
more resources will remain for those 
left, thereby increasing their chances of 
survival). However, in a population, such 
as the black duck's, which has declined by 
about 60%, and in which there is no 
evidence of resource limitation on breed-
ing areas or wintering areas (except tem-
porarily during extremely severe winters), 
there is essentially no resource limita-
tion on which the compensation can be 
based. Inferential support for this con-
clusion may be provided by the fact that 
Blandin (1982:113), after an exhaustive 
analysis of black duck banding data, 
could find no evidence of compensatory 
mortality in wintering black ducks. 
FWS Failure to Act: Chronology 
of Events 
As noted, the decline of the black 
duck is widely recognized among knowl-
edgeable wildlife biologists. During the 
years since 1968, the evidence has 
changed in character and in response to 
changes in methodology; however, the 
basic conclusions over the years have re-
mained remarkably consistent. The pop-
ulation is declining and in trouble (Addy, 
1968; Addy and Martinson, 1968; Geis et 
a/., 1971; Crissey, 1976; Anon., 1976, 
1980; Blandin, 1982; Fig. 1). In spite of 
this acknowledgment, however, during 
the period since even before 1968, there 
has been a lack of effective regulatory 
restriction to protect black ducks. Of-
ficials and managers responsible for 
black ducks demonstrated a strong 
adherence to the status quo, while the 
black duck population continued to 
decline (Fig. 1, Table 1). 
The magnitude of the failure of the 
regulatory system for North American 
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TABLE 2 Estimated Retrieved Kill of Black Ducks in Canada and the United 
States, 1953-1980.1 
Atlantic Mississippi 
Year Flyway Flyway 
1953 321,500 188,200 
1954 324,600 197,500 
1955 387,900 230,800 
1956 315,900 185,700 
1957 318,200 202,100 
1958 276,100 168,500 
1959 183,400 123,000 
1960 258,100 135,200 
1961 204,800 62,900 
1962 214,500 47,900 
1963 215,800 70,400 
1964 234,400 96,900 
1965 217,100 97,600 
1966 281,400 114,600 
1967 265,400 113,100 
1968 301,500 68,300 
1969 307,400 88,100 
1970 297,400 119,700 
1971 293,100 96,000 
1972 236,300 117,900 
1973 262,700 110,900 
1974 294,600 93,300 
1975 274,900 81,000 
1976 327,400 98,000 
1977 195,000 78,900 
1978 262,300 74,800 
1979 218,700 66,500 
19BO 309,000 87,000 
'Source: Anon., (1976:28, 1983). 
'Includes Central Flyway totals. 
'Canadian kill estimates not available prior to 1968 
migratory birds may be seen by compar-
ing significant chronicled events with 
Table 1 (regulations), Figure 1 (winter in-
ventory record), and Table 2 (kill record). 
1955-1967 
In 1959, after the high U.S. black 
duck kills (averaging 523,375 per year; 
Table 2) that were recorded in the four 
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370,800 274,000 644,800 
396,900 281,800 678,700 
417,300 306,200 723,500 
389,300 310,200 699,600 
355,600 290,100 645,800 
374,300 316,700 691,000 
388,900 308,600 697,500 
357,100 303,700 660,700 
426,200 345,400 771,600 
274,100 359,200 633,300 
337,100 378,400 714,500 
285,220 315,400 600,700 
396,800 365,200 762,000 
years from 1955 through 1958, the FWS 
restricted the black duck season from 70 
days to 40 days, and kill dropped sharp-
ly. In 1960, kill rose again significantly, 
and FWS again limited kill. In 1964, the 
FWS began liberalizing regulations, and 
kill of black ducks increased significantly 
(Martinson eta/., 1968:23; Table 1; Table 
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ing areas or wintering areas (except tem-
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there is essentially no resource limita-
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could find no evidence of compensatory 
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this acknowledgment, however, during 
the period since even before 1968, there 
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restriction to protect black ducks. Of-
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black ducks demonstrated a strong 
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decline (Fig. 1, Table 1). 
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years from 1955 through 1958, the FWS 
restricted the black duck season from 70 
days to 40 days, and kill dropped sharp-
ly. In 1960, kill rose again significantly, 
and FWS again limited kill. In 1964, the 
FWS began liberalizing regulations, and 
kill of black ducks increased significantly 
(Martinson eta/., 1968:23; Table 1; Table 
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2; Fig. 1]3. In 1967, regulations were 
restricted slightly (Table 1). 
1968 
In 1968, the Black Duck Sym-
posium convened most of the then ex-
perts and officials knowledgeable and 
concerned about black ducks. The offi-
cials were deeply troubled, as demon-
strated by the following excerpts: 
"Recognizing the importance of the 
black duck to the Atlantic Flyway 
and recognizing that the)species is 
not maintaining itself at population 
levels compared to those of a few 
years past, the Atlantic Waterfowl 
Council at its meeting of August 2 
and 3, 1967, in Easton, Maryland, 
created a Black Duck Committee to 
give added emphasis to the needs 
of this species. The first action of 
the committee was to authorize a 
symposium on the black duck for 
the purpose of bringing together 
most of the known information on 
this species and to focus attention 
on its future needs." (Anon., 1968:1 ). 
"[T]he conclusion I arrive at is that 
here we have survey information 
for a span of more than ten years 
which indicates that the status of 
the black duck has deteriorated 
significantly. True, we are using the 
Winter Survey as a primary indica-
tor .... On the other hand, the long 
term trend, as portrayed by the sur-
vey, may be reasonably close to be-
ing true. In a general way, the trend 
in kill and number of hunters tend 
'It is important to note here that the regulatory 
restrictions begun during the late 1950's and reaching 
"most restrictive levels" during the early to mid 1960's 
were apparently not aimed primarily at restricting 
black duck kill (except slightly during the period 
1961-63). Rather, the restrictive regulations were 
aimed primarily at limiting overall kill of ducks in 
response to low reproduction and populations of 
most prairie nesters. This may be seen by comparison 
of black duck restrictions (Table 1 ), overall season 
lengths in all flyways (Anon., 1975:75), and overall 
kill limits (Anon., 1975:94). 
18 
to give credence to the long term 
Winter Survey figures." (Addy). 
"If we can agree in this meeting that 
the black duck population is and 
has been at or near its historic low 
for the past several years, we 
should endeavor to determine why. 
In this regard, the evidence in-
dicates that harvest has been ex-
cessive in relation to production. 
Kill has been the primary factor re-
sponsible for holding the population 
down to the level that it is." (Addy). 
"In the last analysis, however, black 
duck production is the end product 
resulting from the interaction of all 
the positive and negative natural 
and man-made forces operating in 
the environment and on the popula-
tion. Whatever the production is, 
hunting can take only so much if 
the population is to remain stable 
or allowed to increase. In other 
words, if the productivity of the 
black duck is lower than what it used 
to be, hunter harvest has to be ad-
justed accordingly." (Addy (Atlan-
tic Flyway biologist and FWS em-
ployee), 1968:3-5). 
"[T]he observed Canadian wintering 
population of black ducks decreased 
by 60 percent from the early 1950's 
to the early 1960's. Meanwhile, the 
U.S. wintering population decreased 
about 25 percent." (Munro). 
"Most field workers in Canada 
believe that the major cause of this 
[black duck's] decline is over-har-
vest." (Munro). 
"Most Canadian biologists are of 
the opinion that not all available 
habitat is being used because there 
are not enough black ducks to oc-
cupy it." (Munro (biologist, Cana-
dian Wildlife Service), 1968:6,7,9). 
"Habitat outwardly suitable to the 
black duck is not always used .... It 
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is not a new problem but perhaps 
occurs more frequently." (Benson 
(biologist, N.Y. Department of Con-
servation), 1968:14). 
"At that time [mid 1950's] hunting 
regulations were then relaxed and 
large kills were made. Despite a 
high population, the rate of kill was 
sufficient to boost total mortality 
higher than productivity and the 
black duck population began to de-
c/ in e. By 1959, the black duck pop-
ulation was obviously at a low level 
and hunting regulations were made 
very restrictive. The resulting an-
nual kills were small compared to 
earlier years but still large enough, 
with the much reduced size of the 
black duck population, to result in 
a kill rate of a magnitude that ap-
pears to have prevented an increase 
in the population." (Martinson et 
a/. (biologists, FWS), 1968:50). 
"The thing that really emerges for 
me is that I cannot see where there 
is any need for more research on 
black ducks. It seems to me that 
what you have been showing is that 
the place where we need the effort 
is on the relation between hunting 
and the public we are dealing with. 
By continuing to press for studies 
on production, which seems to me 
from the data available to be essen-
tially stable looking at the total pic-
ture, we are merely trying to put off 
the evil day when we have to make 
unpalatable decisions." (Boyd (bio-
logist, Canadian Wildlife Service), 
1968:56). 
"Although quantitative data is lack-
ing, most biologists in eastern Can-
ada feel that breeding populations 
are dec/ ining or are at least at a very 
low level (personal communica-
tions; Ontario, Blair Dawson; New 
Brunswick, Bruce Wright; Nova 
Scotia, Anthony Erskine and Fred 
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Payne; Newfoundland, Doug Gil-
lespie, Dave Pike and jim I nder]. 
Bartlett (1963) recorded an appar-
ent decrease in breeding popula-
tion on Prince Edward Island be-
tween 1958 and 1961. None of the 
biologists mentioned above felt 
that the present situation could be 
explained by habitat loss, local 
pesticide use or other habitat fac-
tors. Many felt that available habi-
tat was underpopulated (see also 
Bartlett, 1963). Competition with an 
expanding population of breeding 
mallards (Anas platyrhynchos) has 
been .suggested as a cause of de-
c/ ine in Ontario (Cringan, 1960: see 
also ]ohnsgard, 1967). The consen-
sus of opinion is that the size of the 
hunting kill is the most likely expla-
nation." (Reed (biologist, Quebec 
Wildlife Service), 1968:82). 
"Speakers at this symposium 
generally shared the opinion that 
the black duck population is low 
and that wise management dictates 
that we do something to increase 
the size of the population. Most 
speakers also felt that hunting 
regulations affect the size and rate 
of kill and thus the survival of black 
ducks. This paper outlines the regu-
latory measures needed in order to 
bring about an increase in the black 
duck popu /ation." (Addy and Mar-
tinson, 1968:183). 
Addy and Martinson (1968:184-188) 
went on to outline and recommend a 
detailed 5-year program to restore the 
black duck by increasing the population 
by 10 percent per year by reducing kill. 
In his memorandum to the FWS sum-
marizing the Symposium, Addy (1968a) 
stated: 
"It was the consensus of the group 
that while surveys were unreliable 
indicators of population status and 
that no surveys gave an accurate 
current population figure, the 
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regulations were then relaxed and 
large kills were made. Despite a 
high population, the rate of kill was 
sufficient to boost total mortality 
higher than productivity and the 
black duck population began to de-
c/ in e. By 1959, the black duck pop-
ulation was obviously at a low level 
and hunting regulations were made 
very restrictive. The resulting an-
nual kills were small compared to 
earlier years but still large enough, 
with the much reduced size of the 
black duck population, to result in 
a kill rate of a magnitude that ap-
pears to have prevented an increase 
in the population." (Martinson et 
a/. (biologists, FWS), 1968:50). 
"The thing that really emerges for 
me is that I cannot see where there 
is any need for more research on 
black ducks. It seems to me that 
what you have been showing is that 
the place where we need the effort 
is on the relation between hunting 
and the public we are dealing with. 
By continuing to press for studies 
on production, which seems to me 
from the data available to be essen-
tially stable looking at the total pic-
ture, we are merely trying to put off 
the evil day when we have to make 
unpalatable decisions." (Boyd (bio-
logist, Canadian Wildlife Service), 
1968:56). 
"Although quantitative data is lack-
ing, most biologists in eastern Can-
ada feel that breeding populations 
are dec/ ining or are at least at a very 
low level (personal communica-
tions; Ontario, Blair Dawson; New 
Brunswick, Bruce Wright; Nova 
Scotia, Anthony Erskine and Fred 
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Payne; Newfoundland, Doug Gil-
lespie, Dave Pike and jim I nder]. 
Bartlett (1963) recorded an appar-
ent decrease in breeding popula-
tion on Prince Edward Island be-
tween 1958 and 1961. None of the 
biologists mentioned above felt 
that the present situation could be 
explained by habitat loss, local 
pesticide use or other habitat fac-
tors. Many felt that available habi-
tat was underpopulated (see also 
Bartlett, 1963). Competition with an 
expanding population of breeding 
mallards (Anas platyrhynchos) has 
been .suggested as a cause of de-
c/ ine in Ontario (Cringan, 1960: see 
also ]ohnsgard, 1967). The consen-
sus of opinion is that the size of the 
hunting kill is the most likely expla-
nation." (Reed (biologist, Quebec 
Wildlife Service), 1968:82). 
"Speakers at this symposium 
generally shared the opinion that 
the black duck population is low 
and that wise management dictates 
that we do something to increase 
the size of the population. Most 
speakers also felt that hunting 
regulations affect the size and rate 
of kill and thus the survival of black 
ducks. This paper outlines the regu-
latory measures needed in order to 
bring about an increase in the black 
duck popu /ation." (Addy and Mar-
tinson, 1968:183). 
Addy and Martinson (1968:184-188) 
went on to outline and recommend a 
detailed 5-year program to restore the 
black duck by increasing the population 
by 10 percent per year by reducing kill. 
In his memorandum to the FWS sum-
marizing the Symposium, Addy (1968a) 
stated: 
"It was the consensus of the group 
that while surveys were unreliable 
indicators of population status and 
that no surveys gave an accurate 
current population figure, the 
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overall Flyway population had been 
declining and was probably at its 
lowest level of the past 20 years. Pa-
pers were presented on the various 
factors which tend to reduce the 
population or lower its productivity 
such as predation, loss of habitat, 
pollution, pesticides, and others. 
However, with these factors in 
operation it was generally agreed 
that hunting kill was too great for 
the population to maintain itself at 
a high level. In fact, it was generally 
acknowledged that hunting kill is the 
only major mortality factor we can do 
anything about at the present time." 
In 1968, despite the Symposium, the 
recommended kill restrictions, and Addy's 
memorandum, FWS took no regulatory 
action to restrict kill or to provide addi-
tional protection for the black duck 
(Table 1). 
1969 
In 1969, FWS took no regu /a tory ac-
tion to further restrict kill or to provide 
additional protection for the black duck 
(Table 1). 
1970 
In 1970, FWS I iberal ized black duck 
hunting regulations allowing more op-
portunity for kill by hunters. U.S. kill rose 
to 417,400. This was the first time since 
1960 that U.S. kill had been over 400,000 
(Table 1, Table 2]. 
1971 
In 1971, Geis, Smith, and Rogers (all 
FWS biologists) concluded a major study 
of black duck population dynamics: 
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"According to the winter survey, 
the continental black duck popula-
tion declined greatly between 1952 
and 1962. It is believed that the 
survey data correctly reflect the 
population trend during these 
years. Although the population was 
at a lower level, and the kill much 
smaller in 1959-62 than in 1952-54, 
band recovery data show that kill 
rates were equally high in the two 
periods. The population decline 
was probably due to a high rate of 
kill associated with 70 day seasons 
and 4 bird bag limits during 1955-58. 
Failure of the black duck popula-
tion to recover in recent years des-
pite a lower kill is apparently due to 
a continued high kill rate". (Geis et 
a/.). 
"The distribution of mortality 
within the year was examined. The 
rate at which black ducks died was 
4 to 5 times greater during the hunt-
ing season than during the remain-
der of the year. Because there was no 
evidence of unusual mortality dur-
ing the late winter and early spring 
it appears that after the close of 
the hunting season black ducks sur-
vived at a relatively high rate. This 
finding reaffirms the importance of 
hunting as a mortality factor and 
further suggests that late winter and 
early spring nonhunting mortality is 
not serious when viewed on a conti-
nent-wide scale." (Geis eta/., 1971: 
63,66). 
In 1971, FWS permitted the same 
liberalized season restrictions which 
were in effect in 1970 (Table 1). 
1972 
In 1972, the Atlantic Waterfowl 
Council's Technical Section Black Duck 
sub-committee decided to encourage 
more banding "to determine the well be-
ing of black duck populations ... " and 
greater study of wetland habitat man-
agement, including pursuit of the sug-
gestion for a "habitat management sym-
posium." It recommended no hunting 
restrictions. (Report of the sub-committee 
to the 1972 Atlantic Waterfowl Council 
meeting, files, Office of Migratory Bird 
Management, Patuxent Wildlife Research 
Center). 
In 1972, FWS restricted black duck 
regulations slightly, but did not make 
regulations as restrictive as those that ex-
isted in 1968, the year the Black Duck 
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Symposium called for major reductions 
in hunting mortality (Table 1). 
1973 
In 1973, again, FWS restricted black 
duck regulations slightly, but still did not 
even make them as restrictive as those 
that existed in 1968 (Table 1). 
1974 
In 1974, FWS restricted black duck 
regulations slightly, but still did not even 
make them as restrictive as those that ex-
isted in 1968 (Table 1). 
In November of 1974, a biologist in 
the FWS Migratory Bird and Habitat Re-
search Laboratory wrote to the Director 
of that Laboratory after being asked to 
evaluate the black duck winter inven-
tories in the Atlantic Flyway in the past 
10 years. He announced that he had also 
examined relevant kill figures. His 
memorandum to FWS concluded: 
"In reviewing the material compiled 
herein and in rereading the material 
in the black duck symposium held 
at Chestertown in 1968, I am struck 
by what appears to be an inescapa-
ble fact- the major amendable prob-
lem with the black duck is excessive 
harvest." (emphasis in original). 
"It seems to me that administrators 
are at a point where they can make 
one of three decisions: (/) they can 
recognize that the resource is in 
trouble and that a reduced harvest 
is necessary and opt for Martinson's 
solution [Addy and Martinson, 1968], 
(2) they can decide that realistically 
the hunter is too powerful a consti-
tuency to buck and continue the 
present regulations knowing that 
the population will remain perma-
nently depressed, and (3) they can 
pass the buck by declaring the need 
for more research into all phases of 
black duck ecology and put off 
hard decisions for several years." 
(McGilvery, 1974:1,2). 
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1975 
In 1975, the winter inventory count 
was at the lowest level that had ever 
been recorded (Fig. 1 ). 
In 1975, I addressed the Atlantic 
Waterfowl Council meeting in Atlantic 
City, New jersey. I noted that the black 
duck population was at a 21-year low 
and asked for a moratorium on hunting 
to allow the population to rebuild to 
former levels. In 1975, Warren Blandin 
prepared a paper for the Atlantic Water-
fowl Council and his FWS superiors in 
which he noted that the increasing 
numbers of hunters had nullified much 
of the effect of past reductions in season 
length and other regulatory restrictions. 
Blandin proposed various alternative 
types of regulatory restrictions which 
would (he hoped) reduce black duck kill 
substantially (Blandin, 1975). In 1975, 
the Atlantic Waterfowl Council voted to 
increase the black duck population, but 
failed to recommend to the FWS any 
regulatory or other action to accomplish 
the objective. 
In 1975, the FWS approved a season 
with no more restrictions or protection 
for the black duck than had been in place 
the year before. The season was exactly 
the same as 1974 (Table 1). 
1976 
In March 1976, the Atlantic Water-
fowl Council black duck subcommittee 
defined the goal: "To produce a rangewide 
species management plan [for the black 
duck] acceptable to the council." It pro-
posed no restrictions on kill (files, Office 
of Migratory Bird Management, Patuxent 
Wildlife Research Center). 
In June of 1976, the Director of the 
Migratory Bird Habitat and Research 
Laboratory, FWS, mailed to the "Black 
Duck Group" (subcommittee), of the At-
lantic Waterfowl Council, a statement 
of suggested research topics (Martin, 
1976). 
In 1976, Crissey (former Director 
(for 10 years) of the Migratory Bird 
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overall Flyway population had been 
declining and was probably at its 
lowest level of the past 20 years. Pa-
pers were presented on the various 
factors which tend to reduce the 
population or lower its productivity 
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pollution, pesticides, and others. 
However, with these factors in 
operation it was generally agreed 
that hunting kill was too great for 
the population to maintain itself at 
a high level. In fact, it was generally 
acknowledged that hunting kill is the 
only major mortality factor we can do 
anything about at the present time." 
In 1968, despite the Symposium, the 
recommended kill restrictions, and Addy's 
memorandum, FWS took no regulatory 
action to restrict kill or to provide addi-
tional protection for the black duck 
(Table 1). 
1969 
In 1969, FWS took no regu /a tory ac-
tion to further restrict kill or to provide 
additional protection for the black duck 
(Table 1). 
1970 
In 1970, FWS I iberal ized black duck 
hunting regulations allowing more op-
portunity for kill by hunters. U.S. kill rose 
to 417,400. This was the first time since 
1960 that U.S. kill had been over 400,000 
(Table 1, Table 2]. 
1971 
In 1971, Geis, Smith, and Rogers (all 
FWS biologists) concluded a major study 
of black duck population dynamics: 
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"According to the winter survey, 
the continental black duck popula-
tion declined greatly between 1952 
and 1962. It is believed that the 
survey data correctly reflect the 
population trend during these 
years. Although the population was 
at a lower level, and the kill much 
smaller in 1959-62 than in 1952-54, 
band recovery data show that kill 
rates were equally high in the two 
periods. The population decline 
was probably due to a high rate of 
kill associated with 70 day seasons 
and 4 bird bag limits during 1955-58. 
Failure of the black duck popula-
tion to recover in recent years des-
pite a lower kill is apparently due to 
a continued high kill rate". (Geis et 
a/.). 
"The distribution of mortality 
within the year was examined. The 
rate at which black ducks died was 
4 to 5 times greater during the hunt-
ing season than during the remain-
der of the year. Because there was no 
evidence of unusual mortality dur-
ing the late winter and early spring 
it appears that after the close of 
the hunting season black ducks sur-
vived at a relatively high rate. This 
finding reaffirms the importance of 
hunting as a mortality factor and 
further suggests that late winter and 
early spring nonhunting mortality is 
not serious when viewed on a conti-
nent-wide scale." (Geis eta/., 1971: 
63,66). 
In 1971, FWS permitted the same 
liberalized season restrictions which 
were in effect in 1970 (Table 1). 
1972 
In 1972, the Atlantic Waterfowl 
Council's Technical Section Black Duck 
sub-committee decided to encourage 
more banding "to determine the well be-
ing of black duck populations ... " and 
greater study of wetland habitat man-
agement, including pursuit of the sug-
gestion for a "habitat management sym-
posium." It recommended no hunting 
restrictions. (Report of the sub-committee 
to the 1972 Atlantic Waterfowl Council 
meeting, files, Office of Migratory Bird 
Management, Patuxent Wildlife Research 
Center). 
In 1972, FWS restricted black duck 
regulations slightly, but did not make 
regulations as restrictive as those that ex-
isted in 1968, the year the Black Duck 
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Symposium called for major reductions 
in hunting mortality (Table 1). 
1973 
In 1973, again, FWS restricted black 
duck regulations slightly, but still did not 
even make them as restrictive as those 
that existed in 1968 (Table 1). 
1974 
In 1974, FWS restricted black duck 
regulations slightly, but still did not even 
make them as restrictive as those that ex-
isted in 1968 (Table 1). 
In November of 1974, a biologist in 
the FWS Migratory Bird and Habitat Re-
search Laboratory wrote to the Director 
of that Laboratory after being asked to 
evaluate the black duck winter inven-
tories in the Atlantic Flyway in the past 
10 years. He announced that he had also 
examined relevant kill figures. His 
memorandum to FWS concluded: 
"In reviewing the material compiled 
herein and in rereading the material 
in the black duck symposium held 
at Chestertown in 1968, I am struck 
by what appears to be an inescapa-
ble fact- the major amendable prob-
lem with the black duck is excessive 
harvest." (emphasis in original). 
"It seems to me that administrators 
are at a point where they can make 
one of three decisions: (/) they can 
recognize that the resource is in 
trouble and that a reduced harvest 
is necessary and opt for Martinson's 
solution [Addy and Martinson, 1968], 
(2) they can decide that realistically 
the hunter is too powerful a consti-
tuency to buck and continue the 
present regulations knowing that 
the population will remain perma-
nently depressed, and (3) they can 
pass the buck by declaring the need 
for more research into all phases of 
black duck ecology and put off 
hard decisions for several years." 
(McGilvery, 1974:1,2). 
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1975 
In 1975, the winter inventory count 
was at the lowest level that had ever 
been recorded (Fig. 1 ). 
In 1975, I addressed the Atlantic 
Waterfowl Council meeting in Atlantic 
City, New jersey. I noted that the black 
duck population was at a 21-year low 
and asked for a moratorium on hunting 
to allow the population to rebuild to 
former levels. In 1975, Warren Blandin 
prepared a paper for the Atlantic Water-
fowl Council and his FWS superiors in 
which he noted that the increasing 
numbers of hunters had nullified much 
of the effect of past reductions in season 
length and other regulatory restrictions. 
Blandin proposed various alternative 
types of regulatory restrictions which 
would (he hoped) reduce black duck kill 
substantially (Blandin, 1975). In 1975, 
the Atlantic Waterfowl Council voted to 
increase the black duck population, but 
failed to recommend to the FWS any 
regulatory or other action to accomplish 
the objective. 
In 1975, the FWS approved a season 
with no more restrictions or protection 
for the black duck than had been in place 
the year before. The season was exactly 
the same as 1974 (Table 1). 
1976 
In March 1976, the Atlantic Water-
fowl Council black duck subcommittee 
defined the goal: "To produce a rangewide 
species management plan [for the black 
duck] acceptable to the council." It pro-
posed no restrictions on kill (files, Office 
of Migratory Bird Management, Patuxent 
Wildlife Research Center). 
In June of 1976, the Director of the 
Migratory Bird Habitat and Research 
Laboratory, FWS, mailed to the "Black 
Duck Group" (subcommittee), of the At-
lantic Waterfowl Council, a statement 
of suggested research topics (Martin, 
1976). 
In 1976, Crissey (former Director 
(for 10 years) of the Migratory Bird 
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Population Station, FWS, and FWS 
Senior Scientist) concluded that the 
black duck population was in a serious 
decline that was largely caused by hunt-
ing mortality: 
"[S]ome people would like to 
believe that the decrease in black 
duck numbers since the 1950's has 
been due to environmental factors 
other than shooting, and that little 
would be accomplished by reduc-
ing the harvest. Specifically, a 
finger has been pointed at a deter-
ioration of wintering habitat as a 
possible cause. I know of nothing 
which supports such a contention. 
Rather, it seems to me that all of the 
available information favors the 
hypothesis that over-harvest has 
been the most likely cause of the 
decline." (Crissey, 1976:6). 
Crissey suggested two alternatives: 
season closure, or substantial reductions 
in season length to severely limit black 
duck mortality. 
In 1976, the FWS made the follow-
ing statements of note: 
"The upward trend in black duck 
harvest since 1961 is statistically 
significant at the .05 (95% confi-
dence) level." 
"However, the greatly increased 
number of active hunters has more 
than compensated for the present 
reduction in season length and bag 
limit." (Anon., 1976:9). 
In other words, the minor reduction in 
season length by five days (made in 
1973, Table 1) and the option for a 
"noon Wednesday opening" which was 
added in 197 4 (neither of which were as 
restrictive as the season restrictions in 
the late or early 1960's) had been ren-
dered ineffective by increases in the 
number of hunters. 
In 1976, the Service approved a pro-
posal to "stabilize" hunting regulations 
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for the next four years, so as to gather 
base line data for studying the impact of 
hunting on the black duck population 
(Anon., 1976:1). This program was designed 
to hold the kill constant at the level for 
previous years (Anon., 1976:13). Thus, in 
1976, the FWS approved the same regula-
tions which had been in effect in 1974 
and 1975, which were themselves more 
liberal than the regulations in effect 
when the 1968 Symposium called forma-
jor reductions in kill (Table 1). 
1977 
In 1977, FWS employees Martin and 
Carney (1977) showed that hunters were 
spending more time hunting each year, 
thereby showing that even more hunting 
pressure was being put on black duck 
populations. 
In 1977, the FWS approved the same 
regulations which had been in effect in 
1974, 1975, and 1976 (Table 1). 
1978 
In 1978, in spite of the four-year 
"stabilized regulations" program put into 
effect in 1976, the FWS approved regula-
tions which slightly liberalized the re-
strictions on killing of black ducks (i.e., 
the provision for a noon Wednesday sea-
son opening, which was designed to re-
duce opening day hunting pressure, was 
removed; Table 1). 
1979 
In 1979, a draft of the black duck 
"species management plan" was provided 
for review to the Atlantic Waterfowl 
Council and the FWS. In commenting on 
the draft species management plan, 
Henry M. Reeves, biologist and Chief, 
Branch of Operations, Office of Migra-
tory Bird Management, FWS, concluded: 
"The bullet-biting time is upon us. I 
don't think that we can seriously 
consider the possibility that 30 
years from now the black ducks 
plight will be continuing ever 
downward. The public and our "pro-
fession" deserves better- even if 
some very difficult and unpopular 
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decisions are required" (Reeves, 
1979). 
In 1979, the FWS approved the same 
regulations which had been in effect in 
1978 (Table 1). 
1980 
In January 1980, the black duck 
winter inventory was at the lowest level 
that had ever been recorded (Fig. 1 ). 
In June 1980, the FWS published its 
official Migratory Bird Program Manage-
ment Document in which it adopted an 
explicit goal: 
"21.04 Achieve by 1982, a wintering 
black duck population index in the 
U.S. of 450,000 based on a 3-year 
moving average of winter surveys." 
(Anon., 1980a:11). 
Unstated was the fact that the goal, 
adopted at the Black Duck Symposium 
in 1968 (Addy and Martinson, 1968), of 
reducing kill by 10 percent per year for 
five years to allow restoration of the 
species had now been unofficially aban-
doned. The goal of 450,000 is a winter in-
ventory level last achieved in January, 
1969, less than one year after the Black 
Duck Symposium recommended, to no 
avail, major reductions in kill (Fig. 1). 
In September 1980, the FWS pub-
lished the I.R.P. analysis in which it con-
cluded that most of the mortality caus-
ing the black duck population decline 
was caused by hunting (Anon., 1980:16). 
On September 25, 1980, in response 
to another draft of the Atlantic Water-
fowl Council's proposed species man-
agement plan for the black duck, Henry 
M. Reeves wrote: 
"It appears that we're trying to 
avoid admitting that we have great 
concern about the status and trend 
of the species, and are reluctant to 
consider drastic but needed regula-
tory measures." (Reeves, 1980). 
In the fall of 1980, the FWS im-
plemented its own proposal to extend 
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the stabilized hunting regulations for 
black ducks for another five years 
(Anon., 198Gb) and approved the same 
regulations which had been in effect in 
1978 and 1979 (Table 1). 
1981 
In January 1981, the winter inven-
tory count rose slightly from its all-time 
low. 
On July 28-29, 1981, the Atlantic 
Waterfowl Council held its summer 
meeting. At the meeting, Black Duck 
Subcommittee Chairman Spencer (Maine's 
then Migratory Bird Research Leader) 
discussed the draft black duck manage-
ment plan and stated: 
"The current survival rate informa-
tion indicates that t!.e young birds 
are being harvested at a rate that 
doesn't allow the population to 
maintain itself." (Minutes of the 
Atlantic Waterfowl Council Tech-
nical Section, Summer Meeting 
1981, files, Patuxent Wildlife Re-
search Center). 
In 1981, the FWS adopted the same 
regulations on killing of black ducks as 
had been used since 1978 (Table 1). 
These regulations were less restrictive 
than the regulations in effect in 1968, 
when the Black Duck Symposium called 
for major reductions in hunting kill. 
1982 
In January 1982, the winter inven-
tory went down again, this time by 6 per-
cent, to a level of 309,600 (Fig. 1). In the 
years since the FWS produced the Mi-
gratory Bird Program Management Doc-
ument, which adopted the objective of 
achieving a winter inventory count of 
450,000, the FWS had taken not one reg-
ulatory action to achieve the objective 
(Table 1) and had tabulated winter in-
ventory counts as follows: 1980:281 ,480; 
1981:330,461; 1982:309,600. (Fig. 1 ). 
In March 1982, the Service pub I ished 
the National Waterfowl Management Plan 
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Population Station, FWS, and FWS 
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added in 197 4 (neither of which were as 
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for the next four years, so as to gather 
base line data for studying the impact of 
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In 1977, the FWS approved the same 
regulations which had been in effect in 
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In 1978, in spite of the four-year 
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effect in 1976, the FWS approved regula-
tions which slightly liberalized the re-
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the provision for a noon Wednesday sea-
son opening, which was designed to re-
duce opening day hunting pressure, was 
removed; Table 1). 
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In 1979, a draft of the black duck 
"species management plan" was provided 
for review to the Atlantic Waterfowl 
Council and the FWS. In commenting on 
the draft species management plan, 
Henry M. Reeves, biologist and Chief, 
Branch of Operations, Office of Migra-
tory Bird Management, FWS, concluded: 
"The bullet-biting time is upon us. I 
don't think that we can seriously 
consider the possibility that 30 
years from now the black ducks 
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decisions are required" (Reeves, 
1979). 
In 1979, the FWS approved the same 
regulations which had been in effect in 
1978 (Table 1). 
1980 
In January 1980, the black duck 
winter inventory was at the lowest level 
that had ever been recorded (Fig. 1 ). 
In June 1980, the FWS published its 
official Migratory Bird Program Manage-
ment Document in which it adopted an 
explicit goal: 
"21.04 Achieve by 1982, a wintering 
black duck population index in the 
U.S. of 450,000 based on a 3-year 
moving average of winter surveys." 
(Anon., 1980a:11). 
Unstated was the fact that the goal, 
adopted at the Black Duck Symposium 
in 1968 (Addy and Martinson, 1968), of 
reducing kill by 10 percent per year for 
five years to allow restoration of the 
species had now been unofficially aban-
doned. The goal of 450,000 is a winter in-
ventory level last achieved in January, 
1969, less than one year after the Black 
Duck Symposium recommended, to no 
avail, major reductions in kill (Fig. 1). 
In September 1980, the FWS pub-
lished the I.R.P. analysis in which it con-
cluded that most of the mortality caus-
ing the black duck population decline 
was caused by hunting (Anon., 1980:16). 
On September 25, 1980, in response 
to another draft of the Atlantic Water-
fowl Council's proposed species man-
agement plan for the black duck, Henry 
M. Reeves wrote: 
"It appears that we're trying to 
avoid admitting that we have great 
concern about the status and trend 
of the species, and are reluctant to 
consider drastic but needed regula-
tory measures." (Reeves, 1980). 
In the fall of 1980, the FWS im-
plemented its own proposal to extend 
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the stabilized hunting regulations for 
black ducks for another five years 
(Anon., 198Gb) and approved the same 
regulations which had been in effect in 
1978 and 1979 (Table 1). 
1981 
In January 1981, the winter inven-
tory count rose slightly from its all-time 
low. 
On July 28-29, 1981, the Atlantic 
Waterfowl Council held its summer 
meeting. At the meeting, Black Duck 
Subcommittee Chairman Spencer (Maine's 
then Migratory Bird Research Leader) 
discussed the draft black duck manage-
ment plan and stated: 
"The current survival rate informa-
tion indicates that t!.e young birds 
are being harvested at a rate that 
doesn't allow the population to 
maintain itself." (Minutes of the 
Atlantic Waterfowl Council Tech-
nical Section, Summer Meeting 
1981, files, Patuxent Wildlife Re-
search Center). 
In 1981, the FWS adopted the same 
regulations on killing of black ducks as 
had been used since 1978 (Table 1). 
These regulations were less restrictive 
than the regulations in effect in 1968, 
when the Black Duck Symposium called 
for major reductions in hunting kill. 
1982 
In January 1982, the winter inven-
tory went down again, this time by 6 per-
cent, to a level of 309,600 (Fig. 1). In the 
years since the FWS produced the Mi-
gratory Bird Program Management Doc-
ument, which adopted the objective of 
achieving a winter inventory count of 
450,000, the FWS had taken not one reg-
ulatory action to achieve the objective 
(Table 1) and had tabulated winter in-
ventory counts as follows: 1980:281 ,480; 
1981:330,461; 1982:309,600. (Fig. 1 ). 
In March 1982, the Service pub I ished 
the National Waterfowl Management Plan 
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for the United States, in which it stated a 
new goal for the black duck: 
"[3) Achieve an upward trend in 
black duck populations as meas-
ured by the winter survey." (Anon., 
1982:20). 
Now gone from FWS planning was 
any suggestion that the Service would 
impose kill restrictions, such as those 
proposed at the Black Duck Symposium, 
to restore the black duck population. 
Gone even was the goal of raising the 
winter inventory to 450,000. In the 
March 1982 plan, the FWS was apparent-
ly content to "achieve an upward trend 
in the black duck population as meas-
ured by the winter survey." 
On April19, 1982, Howard Spencer, 
as Migratory Bird Research Leader of 
Maine, published a memorandum enti-
tled "Black Ducks: A Statement of Con-
cern." He noted that kill of black ducks 
in Maine had dropped substantially des-
pite the fact that hunting pressure was 
essentially constant at about 100,000 
hunter days. He also presented data 
showing for Maine that: the breeding 
black duck population had declined 
76%; the wintering population had de-
clined substantially; and fewer than 
45% of young black ducks banded in 
Maine survive to breed. Spencer recom-
mended that Maine close the black duck 
season (Spencer, 1982; Maine, 1982). 
In early summer 1982, H. W. Heus-
mann, the waterfowl biologist for Mas-
sachusetts, reported continuing and ser-
ious declines of black ducks in Massa-
chusetts (Heusmann, 1982:14-19). These 
and other relevant data were summarized 
by Joseph A. Hagar, former Massachu-
setts State Ornithologist and an ac-
knowledged authority on black ducks. 
The data show a 45% decline between 
1980 and 1981 in kill of black ducks by 
hunters, while the number of hunters de-
clined by only 2%. Similarly, the num-
ber of black ducks banded in preseason 
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in essentially the same areas and with 
the same methods in Massachusetts by 
state personnel decreased from 276 in 
1967 to 51 in 1981. In the same period, 
the number of mallards banded increased 
from 216 to 293. These figures suggest that 
the number of breeding black ducks has 
decreased alarmingly in Massachusetts 
(Hagar, 1982). Hagar concluded that hunt-
ing is a significant contributing cause of 
the black duck decline. 
In the summer of 1982, Dr. Warren 
W. Blandin, Atlantic Flyway biologist, 
FWS, completed and made available to 
the FWS his doctoral dissertation. Based 
on his experience, years of FWS banding 
data, and modelling techniques, Dr. 
Blandin concluded that hunting through-
out the principal breeding range of the 
species was causing the population de-
cline (Blandin, 1982:122-123). Blandin 
recommended hunting restrictions (Blan-
din, 1982:160-161 ). 
In summer 1982, Howard Spencer, 
Chairman of the Black Duck Subcommit-
tee, submitted the Black Duck Manage-
ment Plan (which had been six years in 
preparation) to the Atlantic Waterfowl 
Council members for consideration at 
their upcoming meeting. In the plan, the 
Subcommittee concluded: 
Harvest restrictions will be 
necessary and should be imposed 
for at least a five-year period begin-
ning with the 1982 hunting season." 
(emphasis in original). (Spencer, 
1982a:15). 
On July 29, 1982, the Black Duck 
Management Plan was presented to the 
Atlantic Waterfowl Council for approv-
al. After discussion, the Council voted to 
accept the plan, but to put off consider-
ation of any restrictions on kill until next 
year. 
On September 17, 1982, the FWS an-
nounced the same regulations which had 
been in effect the previous year[Table 1). 
However, in response to the threat of a 
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lawsuit from The Humane Society of the 
United States, the FWS stated (Potter, 
1982:41253-41254) that it would take "nec-
essary and desirable action" in 1983 "to 
effectively reduce hunting pressure". 
In 1982, biologists and administra-
tors in Maine felt so strongly about the 
decline of the black duck that even 
though overall U.S. waterfowl manage-
ment is the responsibility of FWS, they 
recommended that Maine close the sea-
son unilaterally. Maine officials de-
clined because they felt it would be un-
fair to Maine hunters unless the FWS 
closed the season in the other Atlantic 
Flyway States. As a compromise, Maine 
took action designed to reduce the kill 
in Maine by about 50%. Three other New 
England States also felt strongly enough 
about the black duck decline to take 
minimal restrictive action on their own. 
1983 
In January of 1983, the winter in-
ventory was at the lowest level ever re-
corded (Fig. 1 ). 
In the spring of 1983, the FWS an-
nounced a new objective for black 
ducks: to stop the downward population 
trend as measured by the winter inven-
tory (Smith, 1983:4). Now gone, and un-
acknowledged, were the objectives of 
(1982) achieving an upward trend, (1980) 
achieving a 450,000 winter index level, 
and (1968) restoring the population. 
In the spring of 1983, the FWS an-
nounced plans to reduce kill of black 
ducks by 25% in each U.S. State of the 
Atlantic Flyway where annual kill cur-
rently exceeds 5,000 black ducks. This 
would amount to a reduction in kill of 
some 12 percent overall since only about 
50 percent of total kill occurs in the 
United States (Table 2). Moreover, the 25 
percent reduction in State kill was adopted 
solely for the following reasons: 
[1) It is the minimum reduction in 
kill which biologists believe they 
can make and measure the reduc-
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tion [Blandin [Atlantic Flyway 
biologist, FWS]; Spencer [Maine 
Migratory Bird Research Leader and 
Chairman, Black Duck Comm., At-
lantic Waterfowl Council]; Com-
ments at the Atlantic Waterfowl 
Council meeting, Charleston, S.C., 
july 1982). 
[2) It is the maximum reduction 
which State Fish and Came Direc-
tors in the Atlantic Flyway will ac-
cept [Statements made by Atlantic 
Flyway State Waterfowl biologists 
at the Marc~ 1983 meeting of A tlan-
tic Waterfowl Council, Technical 
Section, Torrington, Conn.). 
In other words, neither the FWS (Potter, 
1983) nor any other Atlantic Flyway 
state conservation agency has given any 
rationale (or data) suggesting that the 
12% reduction in total kill was selected 
because it is a number designed to 
achieve restoration of the population. 
Indeed, the Maine Chapter of the Wild-
life Society (a North American organiza-
tion representing many professional wild-
life biologists) in a 1983 statement, noted 
that there is no biological reason for be-
lieving that such a reduction in total kill 
is sufficient to achieve restoration of the 
black duck population (Spencer, 1983, 
pers. comm.; see also Anon., 1983a). The 
Maine Chapter went on to recommend a 
three year moratorium on all black duck 
hunting in the Atlantic Flyway. 
Finally, with the spring 1983 an-
nouncement from FWS that black duck 
kill will be reduced by 25% in Atlantic 
Flyway States (12% overall) comes rec-
ognition that the FWS has now essential-
ly reneged on the statement published in 
the March 1982 National Waterfowl Man-
agement plan: 
"Current harvest regulations pro-
vide nearly all the regulatory safe-
guards possible for the species short 
of complete closure." (Anon., 1982: 
8). 
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for the United States, in which it stated a 
new goal for the black duck: 
"[3) Achieve an upward trend in 
black duck populations as meas-
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Now gone from FWS planning was 
any suggestion that the Service would 
impose kill restrictions, such as those 
proposed at the Black Duck Symposium, 
to restore the black duck population. 
Gone even was the goal of raising the 
winter inventory to 450,000. In the 
March 1982 plan, the FWS was apparent-
ly content to "achieve an upward trend 
in the black duck population as meas-
ured by the winter survey." 
On April19, 1982, Howard Spencer, 
as Migratory Bird Research Leader of 
Maine, published a memorandum enti-
tled "Black Ducks: A Statement of Con-
cern." He noted that kill of black ducks 
in Maine had dropped substantially des-
pite the fact that hunting pressure was 
essentially constant at about 100,000 
hunter days. He also presented data 
showing for Maine that: the breeding 
black duck population had declined 
76%; the wintering population had de-
clined substantially; and fewer than 
45% of young black ducks banded in 
Maine survive to breed. Spencer recom-
mended that Maine close the black duck 
season (Spencer, 1982; Maine, 1982). 
In early summer 1982, H. W. Heus-
mann, the waterfowl biologist for Mas-
sachusetts, reported continuing and ser-
ious declines of black ducks in Massa-
chusetts (Heusmann, 1982:14-19). These 
and other relevant data were summarized 
by Joseph A. Hagar, former Massachu-
setts State Ornithologist and an ac-
knowledged authority on black ducks. 
The data show a 45% decline between 
1980 and 1981 in kill of black ducks by 
hunters, while the number of hunters de-
clined by only 2%. Similarly, the num-
ber of black ducks banded in preseason 
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in essentially the same areas and with 
the same methods in Massachusetts by 
state personnel decreased from 276 in 
1967 to 51 in 1981. In the same period, 
the number of mallards banded increased 
from 216 to 293. These figures suggest that 
the number of breeding black ducks has 
decreased alarmingly in Massachusetts 
(Hagar, 1982). Hagar concluded that hunt-
ing is a significant contributing cause of 
the black duck decline. 
In the summer of 1982, Dr. Warren 
W. Blandin, Atlantic Flyway biologist, 
FWS, completed and made available to 
the FWS his doctoral dissertation. Based 
on his experience, years of FWS banding 
data, and modelling techniques, Dr. 
Blandin concluded that hunting through-
out the principal breeding range of the 
species was causing the population de-
cline (Blandin, 1982:122-123). Blandin 
recommended hunting restrictions (Blan-
din, 1982:160-161 ). 
In summer 1982, Howard Spencer, 
Chairman of the Black Duck Subcommit-
tee, submitted the Black Duck Manage-
ment Plan (which had been six years in 
preparation) to the Atlantic Waterfowl 
Council members for consideration at 
their upcoming meeting. In the plan, the 
Subcommittee concluded: 
Harvest restrictions will be 
necessary and should be imposed 
for at least a five-year period begin-
ning with the 1982 hunting season." 
(emphasis in original). (Spencer, 
1982a:15). 
On July 29, 1982, the Black Duck 
Management Plan was presented to the 
Atlantic Waterfowl Council for approv-
al. After discussion, the Council voted to 
accept the plan, but to put off consider-
ation of any restrictions on kill until next 
year. 
On September 17, 1982, the FWS an-
nounced the same regulations which had 
been in effect the previous year[Table 1). 
However, in response to the threat of a 
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lawsuit from The Humane Society of the 
United States, the FWS stated (Potter, 
1982:41253-41254) that it would take "nec-
essary and desirable action" in 1983 "to 
effectively reduce hunting pressure". 
In 1982, biologists and administra-
tors in Maine felt so strongly about the 
decline of the black duck that even 
though overall U.S. waterfowl manage-
ment is the responsibility of FWS, they 
recommended that Maine close the sea-
son unilaterally. Maine officials de-
clined because they felt it would be un-
fair to Maine hunters unless the FWS 
closed the season in the other Atlantic 
Flyway States. As a compromise, Maine 
took action designed to reduce the kill 
in Maine by about 50%. Three other New 
England States also felt strongly enough 
about the black duck decline to take 
minimal restrictive action on their own. 
1983 
In January of 1983, the winter in-
ventory was at the lowest level ever re-
corded (Fig. 1 ). 
In the spring of 1983, the FWS an-
nounced a new objective for black 
ducks: to stop the downward population 
trend as measured by the winter inven-
tory (Smith, 1983:4). Now gone, and un-
acknowledged, were the objectives of 
(1982) achieving an upward trend, (1980) 
achieving a 450,000 winter index level, 
and (1968) restoring the population. 
In the spring of 1983, the FWS an-
nounced plans to reduce kill of black 
ducks by 25% in each U.S. State of the 
Atlantic Flyway where annual kill cur-
rently exceeds 5,000 black ducks. This 
would amount to a reduction in kill of 
some 12 percent overall since only about 
50 percent of total kill occurs in the 
United States (Table 2). Moreover, the 25 
percent reduction in State kill was adopted 
solely for the following reasons: 
[1) It is the minimum reduction in 
kill which biologists believe they 
can make and measure the reduc-
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tion [Blandin [Atlantic Flyway 
biologist, FWS]; Spencer [Maine 
Migratory Bird Research Leader and 
Chairman, Black Duck Comm., At-
lantic Waterfowl Council]; Com-
ments at the Atlantic Waterfowl 
Council meeting, Charleston, S.C., 
july 1982). 
[2) It is the maximum reduction 
which State Fish and Came Direc-
tors in the Atlantic Flyway will ac-
cept [Statements made by Atlantic 
Flyway State Waterfowl biologists 
at the Marc~ 1983 meeting of A tlan-
tic Waterfowl Council, Technical 
Section, Torrington, Conn.). 
In other words, neither the FWS (Potter, 
1983) nor any other Atlantic Flyway 
state conservation agency has given any 
rationale (or data) suggesting that the 
12% reduction in total kill was selected 
because it is a number designed to 
achieve restoration of the population. 
Indeed, the Maine Chapter of the Wild-
life Society (a North American organiza-
tion representing many professional wild-
life biologists) in a 1983 statement, noted 
that there is no biological reason for be-
lieving that such a reduction in total kill 
is sufficient to achieve restoration of the 
black duck population (Spencer, 1983, 
pers. comm.; see also Anon., 1983a). The 
Maine Chapter went on to recommend a 
three year moratorium on all black duck 
hunting in the Atlantic Flyway. 
Finally, with the spring 1983 an-
nouncement from FWS that black duck 
kill will be reduced by 25% in Atlantic 
Flyway States (12% overall) comes rec-
ognition that the FWS has now essential-
ly reneged on the statement published in 
the March 1982 National Waterfowl Man-
agement plan: 
"Current harvest regulations pro-
vide nearly all the regulatory safe-
guards possible for the species short 
of complete closure." (Anon., 1982: 
8). 
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Thus throughout the period of the 
60% black duck decline, the FWS con-
sistently: (1) ignored its own self-ex-
pressed duty (see p. 15) and black duck 
population goals, (2) failed to follow the 
advice of its own officials and experts, 
and (3) failed to take sufficient protective 
action to reverse the population decline 
and restore the species. 
Reasons for FWS Failure to 
Take Action 
The question remains, WHY? Why 
has the FWS allowed this situation to 
develop without taking corrective ac-
tion? Why has FWS ignored the guiding 
tenet of wildlife management that the 
first duty is to preserve and protect the 
population base? Why has FWS consis-
tently ignored the principle that mortali-
ty due to sport hunting is the one form 
of mortality that wildlife managers can 
control? Why has FWS consistently ig-
nored the best recommendations and 
suggestions of its own experts that hunt-
ing be severely limited to allow the 
population to rebuild to the extent 
possible? After all, the annual kill of 
black ducks is about 700,000; hunting 
causes between 50 and 60 percent of the 
total annual mortality; and the popula-
tion has continued its gradual decline 
and will undoubtedly never be able to 
recover its population (even if hunting 
mortality ends immediately) in some 
portions of its former range from which 
it has been eliminated. With all this 
evidence, the question remains: why has 
this been allowed to happen? 4 And the 
answer, while it is perhaps best exempli-
fied by the case of the black duck, is 
also important for many other species of 
American wildlife, because this case is 
not an anomaly. 
And, even if the FWS and other offi-
cials reconsider in 1983, and close the 
black duck season, the record of inac-
tion will still have been a classic as a 
failure of modern day wildlife manage-
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ment-a failure which should never be 
repeated. 
Reasons for the failure of the FWS 
and officials responsible for the black 
duck to "bite the bullet" and provide 
necessary protection for the black duck 
can only be inferred from the official 
literature of those involved. Obviously, 
no employees, even mavericks, inside a 
governmental agency can spend much 
time criticizing the official position of 
their employer and still be employed. 
And, most potential employers in the 
wildlife management field are linked di-
rectly or indirectly through contribu-
tions of funds, cooperative working rela-
tionships, professional societies, and 
other similar "ties that bind." While 
these ties are essential for the timely 
transfer of information among profes-
sionals and interest groups, they also 
tend, in my experience, to inhibit critical 
analyses of the management actions of 
one's associates. Yet, some candid and 
revealing remarks bear repeating for 
their illustrative value. 
"The thing that really emerges for 
me is that I cannot see where there 
is any need for more research on 
black ducks. It seems to me that 
what you have been showing is that 
the place where we need the effort 
is on the relation between hunting 
and the public we are dealing with. 
By continuing to press for studies 
on production, which seems to me 
from the data available to be essen-
tially stable looking at the total pic-
'The question, it should be noted, is not whether 
the information available in any year noted in the 
chronology was later proven to be accurate in 
every respect or was the best that could ever have 
been obtained. The fact is that at essentially each 
year, the best information available at the time and 
the expert opinion of FWS personnel and others in-
dicated that the black duck population was declin-
ing and in trouble; yet the FWS and other officials 
failed and often refused to take effective regulato-
ry action to protect the black duck. The question 
is: why did the failure occur? 
SUPPLEMENT TO /NT j STUD ANIM PROB 4[4) 1983 
}. W. Grandy- Failure in American Wildlife Management Monograph 
ture, we are merely trying to put off 
the evil day when we have to make 
unpalatable decisions." (Boyd (bio-
logist, Canadian Wildlife Service), 
1968:56). 
"It seems to me that administrators 
are at a point where they can make 
one of three decisions: (1) they can 
recognize that the resource is in 
trouble and that a reduced harvest 
is necessary and opt for Martinson's 
[Addy and Martinson, 1968] solu-
tion, (2) they can decide that realis-
tically the hunter is too powerful a 
constituency to buck and continue 
the present regulations knowing 
that the population will remain per-
manently depressed, and (3) they 
can pass the buck by declaring the 
need for more research into all 
phases of black duck ecology and 
put off hard decisions for several 
years." (McGilvery (biologist, FWS), 
1974). 
"The bullet-biting time is upon us. I 
don't think that we can seriously 
consider the possibility that 30 
years from now the black ducks 
plight will be continuing ever 
downward. The public and our 'pro-
fess ion' deserves better- even if 
some very difficult and unpopular 
decisions are required." (Reeves 
(biologist, FWS), 1979). 
"We should consider the hunter 
and the species collectively. We 
say we want to improve the status 
of the black duck and if we do, we 
are not going to do it by defending 
the current status to keep the sports-
man happy because we are progres-
sively taking it away from them by 
doing so." (Blandin (Atlantic Fly-
way Biologist), comments in the 
Minutes of the Atlantic Waterfowl 
Council Technical Session Summer 
Meeting (1981 ), files, Office of Mi-
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gratory Bird Management, Patux-
ent Wildlife Research Center). 
The above quotes from experienced 
FWS biologists indicate that one reason 
for the failure of the management com-
munity to take effective protective ac-
tion for the black duck is the necessity 
for making "hard" or "unpalatable" or 
"difficult" decisions. This reference is 
primarily to the fact that the black duck 
is a species highly desired by hunters. 
Decisions described as "hard" or "un-
palatable" mean decisions which hunt-
ers would find hard to accept or unpal-
atable. Hunters, being the primary influ-
ential constituency of State fish and 
wildlife agencies and the FWS, have an 
inordinate influence over decisions, and 
if administrators believe that many hunt-
ers will find a prospective decision un-
palatable, there will be- as there has 
been in the case of the black duck- an 
aversion to making the decision. 
In the case of the black duck, this 
unpalatability would be heightened by 
the fact that even though the black duck 
population has declined markedly, it is 
still very important in the average "hunter's 
bag" (and is one of a relatively small 
number of ducks to shoot) throughout 
the New England states. In other words, 
even though the black duck population 
has declined by about 60%, hunters in 
New England and as far south as New 
jersey still "see a lot". Hunters would, it 
has been widely perceived, be "upset" if 
they "see a lot" of black ducks and can-
not shoot them. Thus as the Blandin 
quote makes clear, one reason for fail-
ing to take action, and defending the 
status quo, has been the desire to "keep 
the sportsman happy". 
"Sixth, there is a question about 
how a reduction in harvest should 
be accomplished- and at this point 
politics rears its ugly head." (Cris-
sey (former FWS Chief of Migrato-
ry Bird Management), 1976:8). 
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tend, in my experience, to inhibit critical 
analyses of the management actions of 
one's associates. Yet, some candid and 
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"The thing that really emerges for 
me is that I cannot see where there 
is any need for more research on 
black ducks. It seems to me that 
what you have been showing is that 
the place where we need the effort 
is on the relation between hunting 
and the public we are dealing with. 
By continuing to press for studies 
on production, which seems to me 
from the data available to be essen-
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the information available in any year noted in the 
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been obtained. The fact is that at essentially each 
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ture, we are merely trying to put off 
the evil day when we have to make 
unpalatable decisions." (Boyd (bio-
logist, Canadian Wildlife Service), 
1968:56). 
"It seems to me that administrators 
are at a point where they can make 
one of three decisions: (1) they can 
recognize that the resource is in 
trouble and that a reduced harvest 
is necessary and opt for Martinson's 
[Addy and Martinson, 1968] solu-
tion, (2) they can decide that realis-
tically the hunter is too powerful a 
constituency to buck and continue 
the present regulations knowing 
that the population will remain per-
manently depressed, and (3) they 
can pass the buck by declaring the 
need for more research into all 
phases of black duck ecology and 
put off hard decisions for several 
years." (McGilvery (biologist, FWS), 
1974). 
"The bullet-biting time is upon us. I 
don't think that we can seriously 
consider the possibility that 30 
years from now the black ducks 
plight will be continuing ever 
downward. The public and our 'pro-
fess ion' deserves better- even if 
some very difficult and unpopular 
decisions are required." (Reeves 
(biologist, FWS), 1979). 
"We should consider the hunter 
and the species collectively. We 
say we want to improve the status 
of the black duck and if we do, we 
are not going to do it by defending 
the current status to keep the sports-
man happy because we are progres-
sively taking it away from them by 
doing so." (Blandin (Atlantic Fly-
way Biologist), comments in the 
Minutes of the Atlantic Waterfowl 
Council Technical Session Summer 
Meeting (1981 ), files, Office of Mi-
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gratory Bird Management, Patux-
ent Wildlife Research Center). 
The above quotes from experienced 
FWS biologists indicate that one reason 
for the failure of the management com-
munity to take effective protective ac-
tion for the black duck is the necessity 
for making "hard" or "unpalatable" or 
"difficult" decisions. This reference is 
primarily to the fact that the black duck 
is a species highly desired by hunters. 
Decisions described as "hard" or "un-
palatable" mean decisions which hunt-
ers would find hard to accept or unpal-
atable. Hunters, being the primary influ-
ential constituency of State fish and 
wildlife agencies and the FWS, have an 
inordinate influence over decisions, and 
if administrators believe that many hunt-
ers will find a prospective decision un-
palatable, there will be- as there has 
been in the case of the black duck- an 
aversion to making the decision. 
In the case of the black duck, this 
unpalatability would be heightened by 
the fact that even though the black duck 
population has declined markedly, it is 
still very important in the average "hunter's 
bag" (and is one of a relatively small 
number of ducks to shoot) throughout 
the New England states. In other words, 
even though the black duck population 
has declined by about 60%, hunters in 
New England and as far south as New 
jersey still "see a lot". Hunters would, it 
has been widely perceived, be "upset" if 
they "see a lot" of black ducks and can-
not shoot them. Thus as the Blandin 
quote makes clear, one reason for fail-
ing to take action, and defending the 
status quo, has been the desire to "keep 
the sportsman happy". 
"Sixth, there is a question about 
how a reduction in harvest should 
be accomplished- and at this point 
politics rears its ugly head." (Cris-
sey (former FWS Chief of Migrato-
ry Bird Management), 1976:8). 
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Crissey's quote brings up another 
reason for failing to act: politics. In the 
case of setting regulations, political in-
fluence can take a wide variety of forms. 
The most basic one is the one to which 
Crissey alludes: perceived political equi-
ty. Each state and indeed each country 
in the Atlantic Flyway wants to be treated 
equally, politically. One state does not 
want to take action that will make its 
hunters unhappy and will benefit the 
other states, unless the other states take 
a similar action. The same analogy ap-
plies somewhat less rigidly to actions of 
the U.S. and Canada. 
This reaction, which is fully under-
standable as a matter perceived politi-
cal equity, is a major deterrent to having 
the individual states in the Atlantic 
Flyway agree on a common plan of ac-
tion. The problem is that political equity 
or equality often does not comport with 
biological necessity or management 
needs. 
As an hypothetical example, some 
states may not wish to reduce kill of 
black ducks, because (inter alia) they do 
not have many black ducks and their 
hunters cannot distinguish them from 
other ducks, or because they have "plen-
ty" and want their hunters to shoot them 
regardless of the overall status of the 
population. In such circumstances, the 
easiest and most common reaction is for 
the states to maintain the status quo or 
adopt a solution which represents the 
"lowest common denominator". And 
the detrimental impact of this pheno-
menon is compounded since, for what-
ever reasons, the FWS consistently fails 
to exert "leadership" on any group of 
state fish and wildlife agencies unless it 
obtains unanimous or nearly unanimous 
agreement beforehand. 
I 
For example, consider what occur-
red in setting the 1982-83 black duck 
season in the Atlantic flyway. Maine 
biologists believed that the black duck 
season should be closed throughout the 
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Flyway and in Maine, and so recom-
mended (Spencer, 1982; Maine, 1982; 
Discussions at Atlantic Waterfowl Coun-
cil meeting, S\Jmmer, 1982). Atlantic 
Flyway waterfowl biologists could all 
agree that at least some restrictions on 
kill were necessary beginning in 1982 
and so recommended (Spencer, 1982a:15). 
However, at the Atlantic Waterfowl 
Council summer meeting (where all 
states in the Atlantic Flyway met to 
"agree" on seasons to be recommended 
to FWS), some states (most notably New 
jersey) objected to any restrictions in 
1982. The FWS did not want to force 
restrictions without agreement from the 
states and some protective action from 
Canada. The result was that the Atlantic 
Waterfowl Council voted (the lowest 
common denominator) to put off any 
restrictions until at least 1983. 
Subsequently, Maine refused to 
close the season in 1982 because politi-
cal officials in Maine believed it would 
be "unfair" to Maine's hunters unless 
the other Atlantic flyway states also 
closed the season (see: newspaper arti-
cle quoting Maine Fish and Wildlife 
Commissioner Manuel by Brian Thayer, 
Maine Sunday Telegram, August 15, 1982, 
page 7B, (files, Office of Migratory Bird 
Management, FWS, Washington D.C.)). 
Maine's "compromise" was to adopt 
regulations designed to reduce the kill 
by about 50%. The regulations they 
adopted were designed to avoid, as 
much as possible, shooting black ducks 
that bred or were hatched in Maine, 
while allowing hunters to kill migrants 
from Canada. Such a decision made per-
fect political sense for Maine, but large-
ly ignored the needs of the black duck. 
Indeed, throughout the process, the 
needs of the black duck had been con-
sistently relegated to a lower status than 
preserving the status quo and attaining 
the lowest common denominator. 
"I am pleased with the way you 
show that the apparent decline in 
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numbers may not be a reality (i.e., 
comments on quality of winter sur-
vey on p. 8-9) and that hunting may 
not be preventing population in-
crease (p. 18). Those two points will 
be our main defense against exter-
nal pressures for closure and other 
attacks which could prevent us 
from implementing the plan." 
(Reed (biologist, Canadian Wildlife 
Service), 1980: comments in a let-
ter to Spencer concerning a draft 
of the black duck management plan). 
This quote elucidates another 
reason for failing to protect the black 
duck which is particularly ironic. My 
analysis of the quote, based on my ex-
perience, is that the author is thanking 
Spencer (as Black Duck Committee Chair-
man of the Atlantic Waterfowl Council) 
for not emphasizing the decline por-
trayed by the winter inventory and not 
emphasizing the negative impact which 
hunting kill (50 to 60 percent of total 
mortality) was almost certainly having 
on the population. The author notes that 
these two points will be the main de-
fense against efforts to close the black 
duck hunting season (so that Canada can 
implement "the plan", which called for 
relatively modest reductions in black 
duck kill (Spencer, 1982a)). 
In my view, the reason for the au-
thor's concern is an increasingly appar-
ent fear in much of the wildlife manage-
ment community of closing hunting sea-
sons. In the black duck situation, the 
fear of many officials of closing the sea-
son is that the season may never be re-
opened, the "anti-hunting element" may 
be credited with a victory, and/or the 
agencies affected will lose support and/ 
or revenues (since hunter constituencies 
and/or I icense fees are very important to 
FWS, CWS, and State and Provincial agen-
cies). 
The point is, however, that, all 
arguments about hunting and anti-hunt-
ing aside, wildlife biologists have always 
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maintained that their first duty was to 
protect and preserve viable wildlife 
populations, presumably throughout their 
ranges. Yet, the resistance to making 
necessary restrictions engendered by 
this fear is tantamount to putting the 
welfare of hunters and hunting above 
the welfare of the black duck popula-
tions in question. For example, this fear 
is, in my opinion, a major reason why the 
FWS in 1983 is suggesting an admittedly 
minimum reduction (12%) in total kill 
(see page 25) in spite of the March 1982 Na-
tional Waterfowl Management Plan state-
ment that : 
"Current harvest regulations pro-
vide nearly all the regulatory safe-
guards possible for the species short 
of complete closure." (Anon., 1982:8). 
Ironically, in a case like the black duck 
where the population has declined marked-
ly, such fear-engendered-action (or inac-
tion) only gives anti-hunters and non-
hunters more reasons to be against hunting. 
There is, in my view, another reason 
for the FWS failure to act which is ap-
parent from the information at hand. 
The black duck decline occurred slowly, 
except in the late 1950's (Fig. 1). FWS 
personnel and others, as scientists, did 
not want to "overreact", particularly in 
light of political pressures and group 
pressure to maintain the status quo or 
adopt the "lowest common denomina-
tor" (see page 28). For that reason, begin-
ning with the serious advocacy of major 
restrictions on black duck hunting (as 
represented by the 1968 Black Duck 
Symposium), cautious and politically 
aware officials resisted making the rec-
ommended restrictions, and they were 
not made. Officials began to rationalize, 
in spite of the continuing population de-
cline, and to develop "reasons" for not 
taking regulatory action to protect black 
ducks and stop the population decline 
(see: for example, Anon., 1975; 1976; Pot-
ter, 1982, 1983; Arnett, 1982). 
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Crissey's quote brings up another 
reason for failing to act: politics. In the 
case of setting regulations, political in-
fluence can take a wide variety of forms. 
The most basic one is the one to which 
Crissey alludes: perceived political equi-
ty. Each state and indeed each country 
in the Atlantic Flyway wants to be treated 
equally, politically. One state does not 
want to take action that will make its 
hunters unhappy and will benefit the 
other states, unless the other states take 
a similar action. The same analogy ap-
plies somewhat less rigidly to actions of 
the U.S. and Canada. 
This reaction, which is fully under-
standable as a matter perceived politi-
cal equity, is a major deterrent to having 
the individual states in the Atlantic 
Flyway agree on a common plan of ac-
tion. The problem is that political equity 
or equality often does not comport with 
biological necessity or management 
needs. 
As an hypothetical example, some 
states may not wish to reduce kill of 
black ducks, because (inter alia) they do 
not have many black ducks and their 
hunters cannot distinguish them from 
other ducks, or because they have "plen-
ty" and want their hunters to shoot them 
regardless of the overall status of the 
population. In such circumstances, the 
easiest and most common reaction is for 
the states to maintain the status quo or 
adopt a solution which represents the 
"lowest common denominator". And 
the detrimental impact of this pheno-
menon is compounded since, for what-
ever reasons, the FWS consistently fails 
to exert "leadership" on any group of 
state fish and wildlife agencies unless it 
obtains unanimous or nearly unanimous 
agreement beforehand. 
I 
For example, consider what occur-
red in setting the 1982-83 black duck 
season in the Atlantic flyway. Maine 
biologists believed that the black duck 
season should be closed throughout the 
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Flyway and in Maine, and so recom-
mended (Spencer, 1982; Maine, 1982; 
Discussions at Atlantic Waterfowl Coun-
cil meeting, S\Jmmer, 1982). Atlantic 
Flyway waterfowl biologists could all 
agree that at least some restrictions on 
kill were necessary beginning in 1982 
and so recommended (Spencer, 1982a:15). 
However, at the Atlantic Waterfowl 
Council summer meeting (where all 
states in the Atlantic Flyway met to 
"agree" on seasons to be recommended 
to FWS), some states (most notably New 
jersey) objected to any restrictions in 
1982. The FWS did not want to force 
restrictions without agreement from the 
states and some protective action from 
Canada. The result was that the Atlantic 
Waterfowl Council voted (the lowest 
common denominator) to put off any 
restrictions until at least 1983. 
Subsequently, Maine refused to 
close the season in 1982 because politi-
cal officials in Maine believed it would 
be "unfair" to Maine's hunters unless 
the other Atlantic flyway states also 
closed the season (see: newspaper arti-
cle quoting Maine Fish and Wildlife 
Commissioner Manuel by Brian Thayer, 
Maine Sunday Telegram, August 15, 1982, 
page 7B, (files, Office of Migratory Bird 
Management, FWS, Washington D.C.)). 
Maine's "compromise" was to adopt 
regulations designed to reduce the kill 
by about 50%. The regulations they 
adopted were designed to avoid, as 
much as possible, shooting black ducks 
that bred or were hatched in Maine, 
while allowing hunters to kill migrants 
from Canada. Such a decision made per-
fect political sense for Maine, but large-
ly ignored the needs of the black duck. 
Indeed, throughout the process, the 
needs of the black duck had been con-
sistently relegated to a lower status than 
preserving the status quo and attaining 
the lowest common denominator. 
"I am pleased with the way you 
show that the apparent decline in 
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numbers may not be a reality (i.e., 
comments on quality of winter sur-
vey on p. 8-9) and that hunting may 
not be preventing population in-
crease (p. 18). Those two points will 
be our main defense against exter-
nal pressures for closure and other 
attacks which could prevent us 
from implementing the plan." 
(Reed (biologist, Canadian Wildlife 
Service), 1980: comments in a let-
ter to Spencer concerning a draft 
of the black duck management plan). 
This quote elucidates another 
reason for failing to protect the black 
duck which is particularly ironic. My 
analysis of the quote, based on my ex-
perience, is that the author is thanking 
Spencer (as Black Duck Committee Chair-
man of the Atlantic Waterfowl Council) 
for not emphasizing the decline por-
trayed by the winter inventory and not 
emphasizing the negative impact which 
hunting kill (50 to 60 percent of total 
mortality) was almost certainly having 
on the population. The author notes that 
these two points will be the main de-
fense against efforts to close the black 
duck hunting season (so that Canada can 
implement "the plan", which called for 
relatively modest reductions in black 
duck kill (Spencer, 1982a)). 
In my view, the reason for the au-
thor's concern is an increasingly appar-
ent fear in much of the wildlife manage-
ment community of closing hunting sea-
sons. In the black duck situation, the 
fear of many officials of closing the sea-
son is that the season may never be re-
opened, the "anti-hunting element" may 
be credited with a victory, and/or the 
agencies affected will lose support and/ 
or revenues (since hunter constituencies 
and/or I icense fees are very important to 
FWS, CWS, and State and Provincial agen-
cies). 
The point is, however, that, all 
arguments about hunting and anti-hunt-
ing aside, wildlife biologists have always 
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maintained that their first duty was to 
protect and preserve viable wildlife 
populations, presumably throughout their 
ranges. Yet, the resistance to making 
necessary restrictions engendered by 
this fear is tantamount to putting the 
welfare of hunters and hunting above 
the welfare of the black duck popula-
tions in question. For example, this fear 
is, in my opinion, a major reason why the 
FWS in 1983 is suggesting an admittedly 
minimum reduction (12%) in total kill 
(see page 25) in spite of the March 1982 Na-
tional Waterfowl Management Plan state-
ment that : 
"Current harvest regulations pro-
vide nearly all the regulatory safe-
guards possible for the species short 
of complete closure." (Anon., 1982:8). 
Ironically, in a case like the black duck 
where the population has declined marked-
ly, such fear-engendered-action (or inac-
tion) only gives anti-hunters and non-
hunters more reasons to be against hunting. 
There is, in my view, another reason 
for the FWS failure to act which is ap-
parent from the information at hand. 
The black duck decline occurred slowly, 
except in the late 1950's (Fig. 1). FWS 
personnel and others, as scientists, did 
not want to "overreact", particularly in 
light of political pressures and group 
pressure to maintain the status quo or 
adopt the "lowest common denomina-
tor" (see page 28). For that reason, begin-
ning with the serious advocacy of major 
restrictions on black duck hunting (as 
represented by the 1968 Black Duck 
Symposium), cautious and politically 
aware officials resisted making the rec-
ommended restrictions, and they were 
not made. Officials began to rationalize, 
in spite of the continuing population de-
cline, and to develop "reasons" for not 
taking regulatory action to protect black 
ducks and stop the population decline 
(see: for example, Anon., 1975; 1976; Pot-
ter, 1982, 1983; Arnett, 1982). 
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Eventually, having these rationali-
zations continue to be accepted and be-
lieved became, in my view, a matter on 
which those involved felt that their pro-
fessional integrity or credibility depended. 
For example, to finally admit that the 
population was declining or in trouble 
would have been to "lose face" or lose 
professional credibility. At that point, 
the arguments became nearly self-gene-
rating. Each rationalization for not tak-
ing action begat another rationalization 
for not taking regulatory action. 
These rationalizations have now re-
versed the wildlife manager's duty, as 
expressed by Gabrielson (1941) and num-
erous others, to take action to I im it ki II 
as the major technique to preserve pop-
ulations. And, the concepts of Gabriel-
son and the others are fully imbedded in 
the FWS principles guiding migratory 
bird management: 
"To limit harvest of migratory game 
birds to levels compatible with their 
ability to maintain their popula-
tions." (Arnett, 1982a:16720). 
Yet, the FWS now supports its decision 
not to close the 1983 black duck season 
by stating: 
"There is no demonstrable cause 
and effect relationship between 
harvest /eve/ and the size of the 
continental black duck population." 
(Potter, 1983:27802). 
An analysis of the final, and over-
riding, reason for the failure of the FWS 
regulatory system with respect to the 
black duck was conducted in 1976 by 
Ted Williams (former editor of the Mas-
sachusetts Fish and Wildlife Agency 
magazine, Massachusetts Wildlife) in the 
prestigious hunting journal Gray's Sport-
ing journal. Williams concluded: 
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"And indeed, it appears that the 
management complex has permitted 
the black to be sorely overshot. Since 
the peak in the mid-fifties, hunters 
have annually accounted for be-
tween 15 and 25 percent of the pop-
ulation, certainly a significant 
chunk when you consider the other 
pressures on the species. Further-
more, in the current black duck 
population there is an abnormally 
high percentage of juveniles- a 
solid indication in any species of 
heavy mortality among adults. Al-
though the daily bag limit was cut 
from four to two quite a while after 
it became evident that the black 
duck was in serious trouble, the 
number of black duck hunters has 
since doubled. Thus despite the at-
tempted cutback, the rate of har-
vest has essentially remained con-
stant. As one courageous federal 
waterfowl biologist publicly de-
clared .... lncreased hunting pressure 
has nullified much of the manage-
ment effort. Administrators must 
decide on a population objective 
for the black duck. If they sanction 
a program of population increase, 
they must recognize that the meas-
ures necessary to achieve that ob-
jective will hurt! 
"Sadly, however, the management 
bosses who dictate fish and wildlife 
policy lack self- discipline. The pro-
blem is that they are funded almost 
entirely by sportsmen- the very 
party they are obligated to regulate 
and educate. Imagine the curricu-
lum at a school where the children 
signed the teachers' paychecks. The 
current set-up is as unfair to sports-
men- whose long-term best inter-
ests are not being served- as it is to 
non-sporting conservationists who 
are denied representation in conser-
vation decision making. 
"Managers have traditionally 
employed winter counts as a tool 
for setting waterfowl seasons. Yet, 
last year when a group of conserva-
tion organizations, calling them-
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selves The Friends of the Black 
Duck, argued for a brief morato-
rium on black duck hunting, citing 
21 years of dwindling winter counts 
as evidence of the need, they were 
informed by the management com-
plex that the counts were unreli- · 
able. Managers can't have it both 
ways. Winter counts can't be effec-
tive tools for modern game manage-
ment when they want to sell li-
censes, and worthless guesstimates 
when someone wants to limit im-
mediate hunting opportunity. 
"When the conservation group 
communicated their concern over 
the black duck's plight to some of 
the fish and game departments in 
the Atlantic Flyway they received 
the most curious responses- to the 
effect that the black was such a 
popular game species that hunters 
couldn't be asked to refrain from 
shooting out the resource. Typical 
of this doublethink was the aston-
ishing declaration of the Migratory 
Bird Research Leader of Maine. 'I'm 
sure you're aware,' said he, 'that the 
black duck is the only significant 
puddle duck in most of the North-
east and to deprive Maine hunters of 
any chance to harvest some would 
create very serious sociological 
problems.' (Emphasis added.) 
"The trouble with fish and game 
departments these days is that they 
don't manage fish and game, they 
manage sportsmen; and they aren't 
staffed by biologists, they're staffed 
by sociologists. The concern is not 
for the problems of the black duck 
hunter of 1980. It is for the appetites 
of the vociferous, a typical black 
duck hunter of the moment- the one 
breathing down the manager's 
neck. Such is the effect of special-
interest funding on professional 
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principles." (Williams, 1976:34- 35). 
Although Williams utilizes rhetoric 
and broad generalizations which rely, in 
this quotation, on some points which are 
technically inaccurate, his broad con-
clusions are, in my view, compelling and 
essentially accurate. Unfortunately, Wil-
liams omits, probably because of his 
familiarity with the regulatory process, 
substantial and critical portions of the 
analysis. First, the black duck is val-
uable: even in reduced numbers, it is 
still the prize duck for hunters in New 
England states. Put another way, many 
hunters prize the black duck above all 
other species (Hagar, 1982), because it is 
wary and reputedly difficult to kill. Fur-
thermore, many hunters view success in 
killing a black duck as an indication of 
their skill as hunters. Thus, the black 
duck is valuable, beyond any monetary 
value; to the individual hunter who es-
teems the black duck as a trophy, prize, 
or symbol of excellence. For avid hunt-
ers who do not know or do not care 
about the decline of the black duck, 
there is a powerful lobby for continued 
or increased hunting of black ducks; 
even hunters who do know and do care 
will be intimidated from taking on their 
fellow hunters and changing the status 
quo. 
Furthermore, the black duck is of 
critical value- or is thought to be of 
critical value- to the State fish and 
wildlife (or conservation) agencies of the 
individual states in New England. Li-
cense fees largely support the opera-
tions of these agencies. It is widely be-
lieved in much of New England that if 
hunters could not hunt black ducks, 
many would not hunt, thus substantially 
reducing the revenues that pay for sal-
aries and programs of the agencies. And 
inevitably in the Atlantic Waterfowl Coun-
cil, there is the feeling that "I'll help you 
with your seasons (and license fees), if 
you help me with mine." 
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Eventually, having these rationali-
zations continue to be accepted and be-
lieved became, in my view, a matter on 
which those involved felt that their pro-
fessional integrity or credibility depended. 
For example, to finally admit that the 
population was declining or in trouble 
would have been to "lose face" or lose 
professional credibility. At that point, 
the arguments became nearly self-gene-
rating. Each rationalization for not tak-
ing action begat another rationalization 
for not taking regulatory action. 
These rationalizations have now re-
versed the wildlife manager's duty, as 
expressed by Gabrielson (1941) and num-
erous others, to take action to I im it ki II 
as the major technique to preserve pop-
ulations. And, the concepts of Gabriel-
son and the others are fully imbedded in 
the FWS principles guiding migratory 
bird management: 
"To limit harvest of migratory game 
birds to levels compatible with their 
ability to maintain their popula-
tions." (Arnett, 1982a:16720). 
Yet, the FWS now supports its decision 
not to close the 1983 black duck season 
by stating: 
"There is no demonstrable cause 
and effect relationship between 
harvest /eve/ and the size of the 
continental black duck population." 
(Potter, 1983:27802). 
An analysis of the final, and over-
riding, reason for the failure of the FWS 
regulatory system with respect to the 
black duck was conducted in 1976 by 
Ted Williams (former editor of the Mas-
sachusetts Fish and Wildlife Agency 
magazine, Massachusetts Wildlife) in the 
prestigious hunting journal Gray's Sport-
ing journal. Williams concluded: 
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"And indeed, it appears that the 
management complex has permitted 
the black to be sorely overshot. Since 
the peak in the mid-fifties, hunters 
have annually accounted for be-
tween 15 and 25 percent of the pop-
ulation, certainly a significant 
chunk when you consider the other 
pressures on the species. Further-
more, in the current black duck 
population there is an abnormally 
high percentage of juveniles- a 
solid indication in any species of 
heavy mortality among adults. Al-
though the daily bag limit was cut 
from four to two quite a while after 
it became evident that the black 
duck was in serious trouble, the 
number of black duck hunters has 
since doubled. Thus despite the at-
tempted cutback, the rate of har-
vest has essentially remained con-
stant. As one courageous federal 
waterfowl biologist publicly de-
clared .... lncreased hunting pressure 
has nullified much of the manage-
ment effort. Administrators must 
decide on a population objective 
for the black duck. If they sanction 
a program of population increase, 
they must recognize that the meas-
ures necessary to achieve that ob-
jective will hurt! 
"Sadly, however, the management 
bosses who dictate fish and wildlife 
policy lack self- discipline. The pro-
blem is that they are funded almost 
entirely by sportsmen- the very 
party they are obligated to regulate 
and educate. Imagine the curricu-
lum at a school where the children 
signed the teachers' paychecks. The 
current set-up is as unfair to sports-
men- whose long-term best inter-
ests are not being served- as it is to 
non-sporting conservationists who 
are denied representation in conser-
vation decision making. 
"Managers have traditionally 
employed winter counts as a tool 
for setting waterfowl seasons. Yet, 
last year when a group of conserva-
tion organizations, calling them-
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selves The Friends of the Black 
Duck, argued for a brief morato-
rium on black duck hunting, citing 
21 years of dwindling winter counts 
as evidence of the need, they were 
informed by the management com-
plex that the counts were unreli- · 
able. Managers can't have it both 
ways. Winter counts can't be effec-
tive tools for modern game manage-
ment when they want to sell li-
censes, and worthless guesstimates 
when someone wants to limit im-
mediate hunting opportunity. 
"When the conservation group 
communicated their concern over 
the black duck's plight to some of 
the fish and game departments in 
the Atlantic Flyway they received 
the most curious responses- to the 
effect that the black was such a 
popular game species that hunters 
couldn't be asked to refrain from 
shooting out the resource. Typical 
of this doublethink was the aston-
ishing declaration of the Migratory 
Bird Research Leader of Maine. 'I'm 
sure you're aware,' said he, 'that the 
black duck is the only significant 
puddle duck in most of the North-
east and to deprive Maine hunters of 
any chance to harvest some would 
create very serious sociological 
problems.' (Emphasis added.) 
"The trouble with fish and game 
departments these days is that they 
don't manage fish and game, they 
manage sportsmen; and they aren't 
staffed by biologists, they're staffed 
by sociologists. The concern is not 
for the problems of the black duck 
hunter of 1980. It is for the appetites 
of the vociferous, a typical black 
duck hunter of the moment- the one 
breathing down the manager's 
neck. Such is the effect of special-
interest funding on professional 
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principles." (Williams, 1976:34- 35). 
Although Williams utilizes rhetoric 
and broad generalizations which rely, in 
this quotation, on some points which are 
technically inaccurate, his broad con-
clusions are, in my view, compelling and 
essentially accurate. Unfortunately, Wil-
liams omits, probably because of his 
familiarity with the regulatory process, 
substantial and critical portions of the 
analysis. First, the black duck is val-
uable: even in reduced numbers, it is 
still the prize duck for hunters in New 
England states. Put another way, many 
hunters prize the black duck above all 
other species (Hagar, 1982), because it is 
wary and reputedly difficult to kill. Fur-
thermore, many hunters view success in 
killing a black duck as an indication of 
their skill as hunters. Thus, the black 
duck is valuable, beyond any monetary 
value; to the individual hunter who es-
teems the black duck as a trophy, prize, 
or symbol of excellence. For avid hunt-
ers who do not know or do not care 
about the decline of the black duck, 
there is a powerful lobby for continued 
or increased hunting of black ducks; 
even hunters who do know and do care 
will be intimidated from taking on their 
fellow hunters and changing the status 
quo. 
Furthermore, the black duck is of 
critical value- or is thought to be of 
critical value- to the State fish and 
wildlife (or conservation) agencies of the 
individual states in New England. Li-
cense fees largely support the opera-
tions of these agencies. It is widely be-
lieved in much of New England that if 
hunters could not hunt black ducks, 
many would not hunt, thus substantially 
reducing the revenues that pay for sal-
aries and programs of the agencies. And 
inevitably in the Atlantic Waterfowl Coun-
cil, there is the feeling that "I'll help you 
with your seasons (and license fees), if 
you help me with mine." 
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Conclusion 
The key to the failure of the 
regulatory system is, in my view, the real 
or perceived value of black ducks to the 
hunter or to the bureaucracy which is 
dependent upon hunting license fees and/ 
or a hunter constituency. Without the 
value of license fees there would be lit-
tle concern over closing a season. With-
out the value, there would not be an in-
fluential constituency composed almost 
solely of hunters. Without the value, the 
political pressure would not be for equi-
ty in opportunities to kill, but rather for 
preserving the species. Without the val-
ue, politicians and others would not feel 
the same political pressures for preserv-
ing the status quo and building ration-
alizations. 
In case after case, to varying de-
grees, this pattern of yielding to vocal 
consumptive interests (or just failing to 
take action) to the detriment of wildlife 
has become apparent wherever the wild-
life species at issue is perceived as val-
uable for recreational, trophy or com-
mercial purposes, or is perceived as hav-
ing great significance for generating 
hunter interest and license fees; and 
wherever active demand exceeds the 
capacity of the species for regeneration. 
This pattern has been apparent most re-
cently with respect to bobcats (Lynx ru-
fus) and east coast striped bass (Roccus 
saxatilis), and is becoming increasingly 
apparent with respect to regulations 
concerning highly sought-after species 
of waterfowl such as mallards, canvas-
backs (Aythya valisineria), and pintails 
(Anas acuta acuta), all of which are cur-
rently at or near historic low population 
levels, and all of which have been sub-
ject to essentially the same regulations 
for many years. 
Unless corrective action is taken, 
black duck-like regulatory failures will in-
crease if waterfowl and other wildlife pop-
ulations decline, while hunter pressure 
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